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ARTICLES 
HOW TO CHOOSE THE LEAST UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
OPTION: LESSONS FOR THE PRESIDENT (AND OTHERS) 
FROM THE DEBT CEILING STANDOFF 
Neil H. Buchanan* & Michael C. Dorf** 
The federal statute known as the “debt ceiling” limits total borrow-
ing by the United States. Congress has repeatedly raised the ceiling to 
authorize necessary borrowing, but a political standoff in 2011 nearly 
made it impossible to borrow funds to meet obligations that Congress had 
affirmed earlier that very year. Some commentators urged President 
Obama to ignore the debt ceiling, while others responded that such 
borrowing would violate the separation of powers and therefore that the 
president should refuse to spend appropriated funds.  
This Article analyzes the choice the president nearly faced in 
summer 2011, and which he or a successor may yet face, as a “tri-
lemma” offering three unconstitutional options: ignore the debt ceiling 
and unilaterally issue new bonds, thus usurping Congress’s borrowing 
power; unilaterally raise taxes, thus usurping Congress’s taxing power; 
or unilaterally cut spending, thus usurping Congress’s spending power. 
We argue that the president should choose the “least unconstitutional” 
course—here, ignoring the debt ceiling. We argue further, though more 
tentatively, that if the bond markets would render such debt inadequate 
to close the gap, the president should unilaterally increase taxes rather 
than cut spending. We then use the debt ceiling impasse to develop 
general criteria for political actors to choose among unconstitutional op-
tions. We emphasize three principles derived from a famous speech by 
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President Lincoln: 1) minimize the unconstitutional assumption of 
power; 2) minimize sub-constitutional harm; and 3) preserve, to the ex-
tent possible, the ability of other actors to undo or remedy constitutional 
violations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the spring of 2011, federal officials announced that, at some point 
later in the year, the federal government would be unable to meet all of 
its obligations unless the federal debt ceiling was raised. There was no 
economic problem. Interest rates on U.S. Treasury bills were close to 
zero percent, and the government could readily issue new debt to cover 
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its expenses, if only Congress would go through the formal process of 
raising the debt ceiling to conform with the budget that it itself had then 
only recently approved.1 There was a political problem, however. 
Expressing concern about long-term fiscal deficits, Republicans in 
Congress—especially those allied with the Tea Party movement—insisted 
on a dollar of current spending cuts for every dollar increase in the debt 
ceiling.2 Even as Keynesian economists warned of the dangers of prema-
ture austerity, Democrats, including President Barack Obama, accepted 
the Republican view that deficit reduction was imperative, but they in-
sisted that increased tax revenues had to be part of the formula for 
achieving that goal.3 A standoff ensued. 
As the day of reckoning approached with no deal in place, some ob-
servers advanced a creative solution. Section 4 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, they noted, forbids the questioning of “[t]he validity of the 
public debt of the United States,”4 and therefore, they argued, the debt 
ceiling is unconstitutional insofar as it forbids the federal government 
from honoring its existing financial commitments.5 Accordingly, these 
observers contended that in the event that Congress and the President 
failed to reach an agreement, the President would be authorized, or 
perhaps even constitutionally obligated, to simply ignore the debt ceil-
ing.6 This proposed gambit was quickly dubbed the “nuclear option,”7 
and it garnered support from some prominent politicians, including 
former President Bill Clinton.8 
                                                                                                                 
1. See Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011, 
Pub. L. No. 112-10, 125 Stat. 38. 
2. See Alan Silverleib & Tom Cohen, Latest Deficit Talks End with a Tense Exchange, 
CNN (July 13, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-13/politics/debt.talks_1_debt-
ceiling-short-term-extension-debt-ceiling-hike (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(outlining evolving brinksmanship between very conservative Republicans and President 
in debt ceiling debate). 
3. Id. 
4. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4. 
5. See Elspeth Reeve, Is the Debt Ceiling Unconstitutional?, Atlantic Wire (June 29, 
2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2011/06/debt-ceiling-unconstitutional/
39408/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (summarizing and excerpting legal 
reasoning in support of presidential authority to disregard debt ceiling on grounds it is 
unconstitutional).  
6. Id. 
7. E.g., Aaron Blake, Obama Won’t Find Safe Harbor in 14th Amendment, The Fix, 
Wash. Post (July 29, 2011, 12:44 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/
post/why-the-14th-amendment-is-not-a-good-option-for-obama/2011/07/29/gIQAynPOhI
_blog.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
8. See Joe Conason, Exclusive Bill Clinton Interview: I Would Use Constitutional 
Option To Raise Debt Ceiling and “Force the Courts To Stop Me,” Nat’l Memo (June 19, 
2011, 4:03 AM), http://www.nationalmemo.com/exclusive-former-president-bill-clinton-
says-he-would-use-constitutional-option-raise-debt (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
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The nuclear option had its own problems, however. For one thing, it 
could backfire. As a hedge against the possibility that the government 
would later default on debt issued by a president acting without congres-
sional authorization, bond purchasers might demand very high rates of 
interest for the “radioactive” bonds, thus destabilizing rather than calm-
ing financial markets.9 But even if the president’s unilateral authoriza-
tion of new debt would pacify the markets, it would apparently avoid a 
violation of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment only by violating 
the separation of powers.10 After all, Article I of the United States 
Constitution gives to Congress, not the president, the power “[t]o borrow 
Money on the credit of the United States.”11 
Thus, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner quickly announced that 
the Administration would not rely on the Section 4 nuclear option.12 Per-
haps that was simply a ploy to increase pressure on Congress to strike a 
deal. If so, it worked, because at the eleventh hour Congress did indeed 
pass legislation raising the debt ceiling and punting to a newly created 
bipartisan congressional “super-committee” the question of how to 
achieve the deficit reduction that was also mandated by the legislation.13 
The super-committee failed to send a legislative proposal to Congress for 
consideration, so as this Article goes to press, automatic spending cuts 
are slated to occur unless Congress enacts superseding legislation.14  
                                                                                                                 
(comparing former President Clinton’s own budget battle experiences to President 
Obama’s and reporting Clinton’s belief that Obama should raise debt ceiling unilaterally). 
9. Cf. Bruce Bartlett, The Debt Limit Options President Obama Can Use, Fiscal 
Times (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2011/04/29/The-Debt-
Limit-Option-President-Obama-Can-Use.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(noting rapid turnover of three-month Treasury bills should quickly resolve these fears 
and limit impact of problem).  
10. See Laurence H. Tribe, A Ceiling We Can’t Wish Away, N.Y. Times, July 8, 2011, 
at A23 [hereinafter Tribe, Ceiling We Can’t Wish Away] (arguing Fourteenth Amendment 
does not authorize president to exercise legislative power to prevent constitutional 
violations). 
11. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 2; see Tribe, Ceiling We Can’t Wish Away, supra note 10 
(describing allocation of borrowing power to Congress). 
12. See This Week (ABC television broadcast July 24, 2011), available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/week-transcript-timothy-geithner/story?id=14147682 
(transcript on file with the Columbia Law Review) (indicating administration had decided 
after careful review that nuclear option was not workable solution); see also Letter from 
George W. Madison, Gen. Counsel, Treasury Dep’t, to N.Y. Times (July 8, 2011), available 
at http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Fact-Check-Treasury-General-Counsel-
George-Madison-Responds-to-New-York-Times-Op-Ed-on-14th-Amendment.aspx (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining Secretary Geithner had “always viewed the debt 
limit as a binding legal constraint that can only be raised by Congress”). 
13. See Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, § 401, 125 Stat. 240, 259–63 
(establishing Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction to recommend legislation that 
would reduce deficit by $1.5 trillion by 2021).  
14. Id. § 302, 125 Stat. at 256–59. Some members of Congress have indicated that 
they wish to repeal the scheduled cuts. E.g., 158 Cong. Rec. H3072 (daily ed. May 17, 
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The foregoing events will likely have important political and eco-
nomic implications, but this Article focuses mostly on the constitutional 
questions that were raised in the days and weeks before Congress 
reached its crisis-delaying deal in August 2011. With influential members 
of Congress—including both the Speaker of the House and the Senate 
Minority Leader—having indicated that they intend to use the debt ceil-
ing as leverage in future battles over fiscal policy,15 a replay of the debt 
ceiling standoff remains a very live possibility. Moreover, the summer 
2011 crisis raised an important, but mostly unrecognized, issue in consti-
tutional law more generally: What should government officials do when 
all of their options are unconstitutional? This Article uses the 2011 debt 
ceiling crisis as a case study to begin to explore that question. 
Under a plausible description of the options President Obama 
would have faced had Congress failed to strike a debt ceiling deal in 
August 2011, every realistic option open to him would have violated some 
constitutional provision: Failure to pay bondholders, contractors, em-
ployees, and other persons entitled to money under federal law would 
have violated Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment and, in addition, 
the President’s obligation to “take Care that the Laws” creating the rele-
vant obligations “be faithfully executed”;16 issuing new debt without 
congressional authorization would have violated the separation of pow-
ers; so too would have other unilateral actions to increase government 
revenue, such as a presidential decree raising taxes or a presidential sale 
of government property without congressional authorization;17 and 
simply printing additional dollars and crediting them to the govern-
ment’s account would have violated the federal statute that limits the 
amount of money in circulation,18 along with the power reserved to 
Congress to coin money and regulate the value thereof,19 and thus could 
have been said to violate the separation of powers and the Take Care 
Clause as well. 
To be sure, legitimate arguments can be made for the conclusion 
that President Obama would have had some constitutional options even 
                                                                                                                 
2012) (statement of Rep. Scott Rigell) (“Sequestration is not a rational course correction, 
but instead it is a violent, sudden, and severe budget cut, the adverse consequences of 
which cannot be overstated.”); 158 Cong. Rec. H2604 (daily ed. May 10, 2012) (statement 
of Rep. Howard McKeon) (“I rise today in strong support of [repealing the scheduled 
cuts].”). 
15. See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (discussing statements of Senate 
Minority Leader Mitch McConnell and House Speaker John Boehner). 
16. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3. 
17. See id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make 
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to 
the United States . . . .”). 
18. See 31 U.S.C § 5115(b) (2006) (“The amount of United States currency notes 
outstanding and in circulation . . . may not be more than $300,000,000 . . . .”).  
19. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 5. 
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if Congress had not acted in August 2011. Some commentators argue 
that Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment only bars a limited category 
of defaults—failures to pay bondholders (but not other obligees, for 
example, Social Security recipients), in one view,20 or more narrowly still, 
only failures to pay principal (but not interest) on federal bonds.21 Other 
commentators have advanced exotic solutions, such as Professor Jack 
Balkin’s arresting suggestion that the United States could mint two one-
trillion-dollar platinum coins, or sell to the Federal Reserve an “explod-
ing option” to purchase government property for two trillion dollars, and 
then keep the money (credited to the government’s account by the 
Federal Reserve) after the option expires (or explodes).22 We explore 
these and related exotica below23 because they help contextualize the 
issue, but our analysis suggests that the President’s only realistic options 
were all unconstitutional.24 At a minimum, we are willing to assume that 
                                                                                                                 
20. See Michael Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, Fourteenth Amendment 
Style, 33 Tulsa L.J. 561, 580–89 (1997) [hereinafter Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced 
Budgets] (arguing “public debt” in Section 4 of Fourteenth Amendment encompasses 
only financial obligations stemming from agreements and Social Security is not such a 
financial obligation); Michael Abramowicz, Train Wrecks, Budget Deficits, and the 
Entitlements Explosion: Exploring the Implications of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Public Debt Clause 43–45 (George Wash. Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Paper 
No. 575, 2011) [hereinafter Abramowicz, Train Wrecks], available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/ abstract=1874746 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (same); John Berlau, 
Constitutional Nonsense on Debt, Nat’l Rev. Online (July 8, 2011, 12:00 PM), 
www.nationalreview.com/articles/271329/constitutional-nonsense-debt-john-berlau (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing “public debt” does not include government 
benefits). 
21. Cf. Garrett Epps, Our National Debt “Shall Not Be Questioned,” the Constitution 
Says, Atlantic (May 4, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/
05/our-national-debt-shall-not-be-questioned-the-constitution-says/238269/ (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (noting perhaps only outright repudiation of obligations, but 
not temporary default or delay in payment, is barred); Michael Stern, “Threatening 
Default”: A Response to Professor Balkin, Point Ord. (July 1, 2011, 6:04 PM), 
http://www.pointoforder.com/2011/07/01/threatening-default-a-response-to-professor-
balkin/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing only outright repudiation of 
public debt violates Section 4 of Fourteenth Amendment). 
22. See Jack M. Balkin, 3 Ways Obama Could Bypass Congress, CNN (July 28, 2011), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2011-07-28/opinion/balkin.obama.options_1_debt-ceiling-
congress-coins [hereinafter Balkin, Ways to Bypass] (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
Because 31 U.S.C. § 5112(k) grants the Secretary of the Treasury the discretion over the 
denomination and issuance of platinum bullion coins, it could arguably be used to 
circumvent the statutory limit on currency notes. 
23. See infra Part III.C. 
24. We do not directly consider the proposal of Professors Eric Posner and Adrian 
Vermeule, under which the President could simply issue new debt pursuant to his 
supposed “paramount duty to ward off serious threats to the constitutional and economic 
system.” Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Obama Should Raise the Debt Ceiling on His 
Own, The Opinion Pages, N.Y. Times (July 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/
22/opinion/22posner.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Posner and Vermeule 
do not attempt to tie this duty to any particular constitutional text. Indeed, in their view, 
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that is true. If it turns out not to have been true in 2011, it may well be 
true in future crises. 
The Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I describes in greater detail 
the nature of the options that confronted President Obama in the 
summer of 2011. It elaborates on an exchange of views between Professor 
Laurence Tribe and one of the current authors, which first appeared in 
essays in The New York Times,25 the online magazine Verdict,26 and the 
eponymous blog of the other of the current authors,27 to show that the 
real issue was not whether the debt ceiling statute violated Section 4 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, but which unconstitutional option the 
President ought to have chosen had the day of reckoning arrived. 
Part II answers that question. For simplicity, we focus on three op-
tions and rank them from worst to least bad. We conclude that the 
nuclear option would have been the President’s least bad option. Read-
ers may be surprised at our further conclusion. We tentatively suggest 
that a unilateral tax increase by the President comes in second place, less 
bad than the option that the President and nearly every other politician 
appeared to favor: unilateral spending cuts. 
Part III draws general lessons about how the President and other 
government officials should choose among unconstitutional options. We 
                                                                                                                 
the very effort to constrain authority by law in emergencies is in vain. See Eric A. Posner & 
Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic 90–93 (2010) 
(characterizing actual workings of American administrative law as exemplifying theory of 
Carl Schmitt). Although we reach the same conclusion as Posner and Vermeule about the 
best course of action for the President, we do not endorse their view that emergencies 
provide extralegal justifications. Indeed, our premise is more nearly the opposite: We 
argue that even when the president has no lawful options, his decisions are constrained by 
law. 
25. See Tribe, Ceiling We Can’t Wish Away, supra note 10. 
26. See Neil H. Buchanan, The Debt Ceiling Law Is Unconstitutional: A Reply to 
Professor Tribe, Verdict (July 11, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/07/11/the-debt-
ceiling-law-is-unconstitutional (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (disagreeing with 
Professor Tribe’s view that debt ceiling’s unconstitutionality would leave President unable 
to provide remedy); see also Neil H. Buchanan, The Debt-Limit Crisis: A Problem That 
Will Keep Coming Back Unless President Obama Takes a Constitutional Stand Now, 
Verdict (July 7, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/07/07/the-debt-limit-crisis (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that debt limit is dangerous policy and that results 
of default by federal government would be catastrophic). 
27. See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, Professor Tribe Replies to Professor Buchanan 
Replying to Professor Tribe Replying to . . . ., Dorf on L. (July 21, 2011, 12:20 AM), 
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2011/07/professor-tribe-replies-to-professor.html (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (replying to Buchanan and arguing debt ceiling only creates 
crisis in combination with other acts of Congress). The Article also builds on some 
observations that first appeared in Michael C. Dorf, The Debt Ceiling Crisis Reveals a 
Constitutional Gap: How To Choose Among Unconstitutional Options, Verdict (Aug. 1, 
2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/08/01/the-debt-ceiling-crisis-reveals-a-constitution
al-gap (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing American legal precedents and 
tradition provide scant guidance for actors facing choice among unconstitutional 
options). 
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contend that the task of a government official in choosing among uncon-
stitutional options is to choose the “least unconstitutional” one, rather 
than simply to make a policy choice. Policy considerations inevitably 
inform the analysis of what counts as least unconstitutional, in part 
because the Constitution itself nowhere allows that government officials 
may sometimes be required to disobey one or more of its provisions in 
order to satisfy one or more other provisions. Nonetheless, the decision 
whether to violate one constitutional provision rather than another (or 
to violate a single provision in one way rather than another) is not, in our 
view, to be decided by an all-things-considered policy judgment. Instead, 
as we explain at greater length in Part III, distinctively constitutional poli-
cies—such as preservation of the balance of powers among the 
branches—should be given extra weight in a calculus that also gives some 
weight to sub-constitutional policies. We provide guidelines that build 
upon President Lincoln’s famous “all the laws, but one” speech.28 Part III 
also explores whether the least unconstitutional option ought, in virtue 
of that fact, to be deemed constitutional. We ultimately disapprove of 
such post hoc relabeling because it risks obscuring real conflicts among 
constitutional requirements and values.  
I. THE BUDGET PROCESS, THE DEBT CEILING, AND THE POLITICAL CRISIS 
To understand the nature of the choices President Obama nearly 
faced in the summer of 2011, and the choices that a future president 
could face should the crisis recur, this Part begins by placing the budget 
standoff in context. In this Part, we show how the debt ceiling operates in 
tandem with a larger web of statutory and constitutional constraints on 
presidential action.  
A. The Annual Federal Budget 
The federal government of the United States is funded on an annual 
cycle, with the political branches engaged each year in a process that 
plays a large role in determining the levels of spending and tax collection 
that the government may undertake.29 Those policy decisions—in combi-
nation with other, longer-term policy decisions—determine who receives 
various benefits and who bears certain burdens as a result of the various 
programs and activities funded and operated by the federal government 
and the means by which funds to finance the government are collected.30 
                                                                                                                 
28. See infra text accompanying notes 156–163. 
29. See generally 31 U.S.C. § 1105 (2006) (detailing requirements for yearly budget 
submitted by president). 
30. Annual decisions only partly determine spending and taxing levels, because most 
spending—so-called “entitlements,” interest on the national debt, and other “mandatory” 
spending—as well as most of the tax code is enacted in statutes that remain in force from 
year to year. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 401 (a)–(b) (2006) (appropriating funds collected out 
of various income taxes to Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund as well as 
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Taken together, the short-term and long-term policies also shape, to a 
very important degree, the level and nature of economic activity at any 
given time, as well as the likely path of future economic growth, the 
extent of environmental harms and remediation, the provision of educa-
tion at all levels, and myriad other variables that affect the lives of current 
and future citizens. 
The budget process is, therefore, political in every sense of the word. 
Federal budgetary decisions matter deeply in the day-to-day lives of 
people, and they often determine the political fates of members of 
Congress and presidents.31 And as the political culture has become less 
cooperative over the past few decades, the budgetary process has come 
under increasing strain.32 It is thus increasingly likely that we will soon 
enter uncharted territory, with budgetary gridlock forcing the president 
to take actions that test constitutional limits. 
B. The Debt Ceiling’s Purported Limitation on Borrowing 
The annual federal budget authorizes government agencies to carry 
out functions that require the expenditure of funds.33 When a budget is 
passed, the Treasury Department is authorized to issue funds under the 
federal government’s array of programs and contracts.34 The budget 
must include both the authority to undertake specific activities (to build 
bridges, to pay medical benefits, and so on) and the appropriation of 
money to spend on those activities.35 The final appropriations bills thus 
provide the legal authority to take money that is in the federal govern-
ment’s possession and spend it on authorized programs.  
The money in the government’s possession at any moment includes 
revenues collected from taxation and other sources (such as various 
                                                                                                                 
Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund); see also Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 
160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715, 729 (2012) (noting in 2010 fiscal year, sixty-one percent of federal 
spending was mandatory spending, and percentage has been increasing over time). Of 
course, Congress could exert more annual control over spending by replacing entitlement 
formulae with annual appropriations. See id. (characterizing entitlement provisions as 
“ced[ing] the institutional advantage of annual appropriations” to president). 
31. See Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process 3 (3d ed. 2007) 
(“In national politics, it is now the age of budgeting.”). 
32. Id. at 2–4, 108–10 (noting increased political gridlock as federal budget grew).  
33. Generally, federal agencies cannot use funds until they have been appropriated, 
via the yearly budget or some other statutory authorization. See 31 U.S.C. § 1347 (“An 
agency in existence for more than one year may not use amounts otherwise available for 
obligation to pay its expenses without a specific appropriation or specific authorization by 
law.”). 
34. See id. § 321(a)(3) (“The Secretary of the Treasury shall . . . issue warrants for 
money drawn on the Treasury consistent with appropriations . . . .”). 
35. Id. § 1105(a)(12)–(22).  
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fees).36 If the money available at any given moment is inadequate to fund 
the appropriated programs, the law authorizes the Treasury to borrow 
funds sufficient to cover the shortfall.37 If the current levels of appropri-
ated spending fall short of annual revenues (that is, if the government 
runs a surplus), the remaining funds are used to repay previously issued 
debt obligations as those debt obligations come due.38 
Therefore, together with mandatory spending,39 each year’s budget 
process implies a change in the overall level of outstanding federal 
debt.40 If appropriated spending exceeds authorized taxes, the Treasury 
is instructed to borrow more money, under Congress’s Article I power to 
borrow money on the credit of the United States.41 This instruction in-
cludes borrowing any funds necessary to repay the principal and interest 
on the debt obligations from previous years that have come due, allowing 
the aggregate level of debt to rise even while the federal government 
honors its contractual commitments to its creditors.42 
The annual change in the aggregate level of the federal govern-
ment’s debt, therefore, is necessarily determined by the difference 
between spending and tax revenues authorized in the budget.43 If, for 
example, the total debt is ten trillion dollars at the beginning of the fiscal 
year, and spending appropriations exceed tax revenues by one trillion 
dollars during the fiscal year, then the debt will go up to eleven trillion 
dollars (putting aside daily compounding of interest and similar factors). 
The budget itself both determines the necessary change in aggregate 
borrowing and authorizes any new borrowing that is required to carry 
out the will of Congress, as expressed in its duly enacted budget. 
                                                                                                                 
36. See id. § 3302(b) (requiring deposit of all public funds into Treasury); id. § 3720 
(requiring money collected by other agencies to be deposited with Treasury). For an 
example of the various fees collected by the Treasury, see the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) fee schedule detailed by 31 C.F.R. § 1.7 (2012) (outlining four categories of FOIA 
requesters and defining fees and fee waiver provisions). 
37. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3104(a) (“The Secretary of the Treasury may borrow on the 
credit of the United States Government amounts necessary for expenditures authorized by 
law . . . .”); id. § 3102(a) (allowing Treasury Secretary to issue bonds); id. § 3103(a) 
(allowing Treasury Secretary to issue notes).  
38. Net repayment of debt last occurred during the late Clinton administration, as 
the public debt shrank from $3,772.3 billion in 1997 to $3,319.6 billion in 2001. Cong. 
Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020, at 126 
(2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=10871&type=1 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
39. See supra note 30. 
40. Reflecting this reality, every federal budget must include an up-to-date report to 
Congress on the level of federal debt. 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(10), (36).  
41. See supra note 37.  
42. See 31 U.S.C. § 3111 (allowing Treasury to issue new obligations in order to 
redeem or refund outstanding bonds, notes, bills, and certificates).  
43. See, e.g., Jacqueline Murray Brux, Economic Issues and Policy 393 (5th ed. 2010) 
(defining “national debt”). 
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Accordingly, there has always been an unofficial “debt ceiling.” That 
is, when Congress and the president determine the levels of spending 
and revenues, they also necessarily determine the path of the national 
debt. The debt will be as high as Congress permits, and no higher. Vari-
ous agencies of the federal government issue estimates of how any 
budget will change the aggregate level of debt, providing that infor-
mation to Congress, the president, and the public as part of the negotia-
tions over each year’s budget choices.44 Subject to unexpected changes in 
the economic conditions that can alter tax revenues or require different 
levels of expenditures,45 the passage of a new budget is necessarily a state-
ment that the government is planning to owe a certain amount of money 
at any given time.  
Even though the budget process itself is both necessary and suffi-
cient to empower Congress to limit the government’s debt, the total level 
of debt has become a politically salient (albeit highly inaccurate) 
measure of the government’s “fiscal responsibility.”46 As the national debt 
level has risen over time, politicians and the public have expressed 
concern that this trend might harm the economy, now or in the future.47 
This concern is often manifested in claims that the debt level is impover-
ishing “our children and grandchildren,”48 who will purportedly bear the 
                                                                                                                 
44. See 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(21)(B) (requiring president to submit to Congress 
budget showing “specific aspects of the program of, and appropriations for, each agency”); 
id. § 1105(a)(21)(C) (requiring this budget to include estimated goals and financial 
requirements). For an example of such a published estimate, see Office of Mgmt. & 
Budget, Analytical Perspectives: Fiscal Year 2012 Budget of the U.S. Government 115–18 
(2012) [hereinafter OMB, Analytical Perspectives], available at http://www.whitehouse
.gov/ sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/spec.pdf (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
45. See, e.g., OMB, Analytical Perspectives, supra note 44, at 119 (“During the budget 
execution phase, the Government sometimes finds that it needs more funding than the 
Congress has appropriated for the fiscal year because of unanticipated circumstances.”).  
46. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H5854–55 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2011) (statement of Rep. 
Tom Reed) (“Mr. Speaker, $14.4 trillion; $1.6 trillion every year added onto that national 
debt. The people in November, 2010, spoke loudly . . . . They want us to get our fiscal 
house in order.”); 157 Cong. Rec. H5678 (daily ed. July 28, 2011) (statement of Rep. Jerry 
McNerney) (“Democrats and Republicans agree that raising the Federal debt is 
unsustainable, that the default is absolutely unacceptable, and that we must set our 
country on a course of fiscal responsibility.”).  
47. See, e.g., Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, Frustration with Congress 
Could Hurt Republican Incumbents 17 (2011), available at http://www.people-press.org/
files/legacy-pdf/12-15-11%20Congress%20and%20Economy%20release.pdf (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (finding seventy-six percent of respondents believe debt is 
“major threat” to national economy). 
48. See, e.g., 175 Cong. Rec. H7637 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2011) (statement of Rep. 
Michael McCaul) (“Our debt burden in this country is so heavy, it is no longer simply a 
financial issue; it is a moral issue. We have spent and spent, racking up astronomical debt 
that will dampen the American Dream for our children and grandchildren.”). 
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burdens of the nation’s debt yet receive none of the benefits of the 
activities that gave rise to the debt.49 
In the face of concerns that the debt might be rising in an uncon-
trolled fashion—even though, as noted, Congress maintains complete 
control over the level and path of federal debt—Congress began in the 
early twentieth century to impose a purported limit on total federal debt. 
Originally enacted in 1917,50 and imposed in its current form beginning 
in 1939,51 the debt ceiling law imposes an upper limit on the face amount 
of debt that the U.S. government can owe at any time.52 
This limit is, however, calculated in a peculiar fashion. It includes in 
the total measure of the debt owed by the federal government the value 
of loans that the federal government has made to itself.53 That is, when 
the government’s internal accounts treat interagency obligations as 
“government borrowing” (without noting that the government is also 
lending the money), then that accounting convention increases the debt 
of the United States, as defined by the debt ceiling statute.54 Moreover, 
with the economy growing over time, the government’s ability to finance 
its obligations improves as well. The debt ceiling, however, is denomi-
                                                                                                                 
49. This is a grossly inaccurate view of the underlying reality, in no small part because 
money borrowed today may be put to productive use that will benefit those very children 
and grandchildren. For example, the government may purchase land they can use for 
recreation or pay teachers to educate them. But this is not the place for us to argue against 
the view that the government faces a long-term fiscal crisis or to suggest that even if such a 
crisis looms, efforts to redress it should be delayed until a period of sustained economic 
growth. For further discussion of these issues, see generally Neil H. Buchanan, Good 
Deficits: Protecting the Public Interest from Deficit Hysteria, 31 Va. Tax Rev. 75 (2011) 
(arguing many deficit fears are unfounded and proposing establishment of independent 
agency to identify spending projects that warrant debt financing); Neil H. Buchanan, 
What Do We Owe Future Generations?, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1237 (2009) (arguing that 
likely higher living standards of future generations undercut claim that current public 
debt unfairly disadvantages such future generations). The salient point here is that the 
widespread perception of the need for deficit reduction has been lately driving federal 
budgetary priorities. 
50. Second Liberty Bond Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-43, 40 Stat. 288.  
51. Amendment to Second Liberty Bond Act, Pub. L. No. 76-201, 53 Stat. 1071 
(1939); see also D. Andrew Austin & Mindy R. Levit, Cong. Research Serv., RL 31967, The 
Debt Limit: History and Recent Increases 3 (2011) (describing history of debt ceiling, 
including 1939 changes that created aggregate ceiling of all government debt). 
52. 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006). 
53. See Schick, supra note 31, at 124. 
54. This is not an insignificant sum. At the end of fiscal year 2011, gross federal debt 
was approximately $14.8 trillion, while the debt actually held by the public (which includes 
all lenders, foreign and domestic, as well as the Federal Reserve System, but not 
interagency debt within the federal government) was approximately $8.5 trillion. U.S. 
Federal Debt by Year, USGovernmentSpending.com (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.us
governmentspending.com/federal_debt (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The 
difference—more than one-third of gross debt—was mostly the internal obligations in the 
Social Security Trust Funds. See Dep’t of the Treasury Fin. Mgmt. Serv., Treasury Bull., 
June 2012, at 21 tbl.FD-1 (detailing debt totals and holders for fiscal year 2011). 
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nated in dollars, rather than as a percentage of national income,55 which 
effectively lowers the debt ceiling over time, unless Congress acts to 
increase it.56 
As history has unfolded in the years since the debt ceiling statute was 
first enacted, Congress has generally acted to increase the debt ceiling as 
necessary, in line with the new accumulated borrowing needs implied by 
annual budgets.57 Prior to 2011, there were brief political standoffs over 
proposed increases in the debt ceiling, with Congresses under the con-
trol of one political party using the debt ceiling vote to try to extract 
concessions from a president of the opposite party—or simply using the 
debt ceiling vote58 as a moment to make speeches about fiscal respon-
sibility.59 While these standoffs have arisen occasionally over the decades, 
the mid-2011 political crisis was the first time that it appeared that 
Congress might simply refuse to increase the debt ceiling, even though 
its own budget required more borrowing to fund its required spending 
levels, given its decisions about tax revenues and other laws on the books. 
Although that crisis was ultimately defused, the Minority Leader in 
the United States Senate subsequently announced that the debt ceiling 
would henceforth become a weapon in budget negotiations.60 The 
Speaker of the House endorsed continued debt-ceiling brinksmanship in 
                                                                                                                 
55. See 31 U.S.C. § 3101(b) (“The face amount of obligations issued under this 
chapter and the face amount of obligations whose principal and interest are guaranteed 
by the United States Government (except guaranteed obligations held by the Secretary of 
the Treasury), may not be more than $14,294,000,000,000, outstanding at one time . . . .”). 
56. To be clear, even denominating a debt limit in percentage-of-GDP terms could 
have perverse consequences, under certain circumstances. During a recession, for 
example, GDP falls (by definition). If the debt were limited to a fixed percentage of GDP, 
the debt limit statute would affirmatively require the president to decrease spending or 
raise taxes in the teeth of the recession. This would mean that a percentage-of-GDP limit 
could force decisions that would actively reinforce the negative trend of the economy. 
Although we do not endorse a debt limit statute in any form, we do note that expressing a 
debt limit as a percentage of the economy’s potential GDP would avoid this problem, 
because potential GDP generally is invariant to short-term recessionary fluctuations in the 
economy. 
57. See Austin & Levit, supra note 51, at 15 tbl.2 (listing increases in debt limit since 
1993). 
58. See id. at 12–15 (discussing process of raising debt ceiling from 2008 to 2010).  
59. See, e.g., 148 Cong. Rec. 8718 (2002) (statement of Rep. Jim Turner) (“The 
statutory debt ceiling is a law that provides the maximum amount that our Federal 
Government can go into debt. It is one of the few tools that we have to promote fiscal 
responsibility and require fiscal discipline in this House.”). 
60. See 157 Cong. Rec. S5219 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 2011) (statement of Sen. Mitch 
McConnell) (“[N]ever again will any President, from either party, be allowed to raise the 
debt ceiling . . . without having to engage in the kind of debate we have just come 
through.”). 
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May 2012.61 No longer will disagreements over spending, taxes, and 
borrowing be worked out only through the budget process itself, with 
Congress then agreeing to raise the debt ceiling to comport with the pro-
jected increase in debt that its own decisions require. Congress (or, 
under certain circumstances, a blocking minority of the Senate) might in 
the future refuse to increase the debt limit, engaging in political brinks-
manship to extract concessions on policy from the other party’s leader-
ship. Such maneuvers differ from the brinksmanship in normal budget 
negotiations, where members of Congress can block the government 
from agreeing to future obligations, because a refusal to increase the debt 
ceiling makes it impossible for the government to honor its current 
obligations, to which it committed when it passed its budget. 
Furthermore, although the most recent debt ceiling standoff was 
focused on federal spending itself—with newly authorized increases in 
borrowing tied to future decreases in spending by the federal govern-
ment62—there is nothing to prevent the debt ceiling from being held 
hostage to non-budgetary demands. A sufficiently motivated bloc in 
Congress could require changes in various social policies, or national 
security policies, or any other politically contentious area of the law, 
before agreeing to increase the debt ceiling. Such tactics could force the 
government to choose between violating its own commitments and mak-
ing changes in policies that are unrelated to those existing commitments. 
With the emergence of this apparently real threat—that Congress 
might one day soon refuse to back up its budgetary commitments with 
sufficient borrowing authority—it is now possible to imagine a situation 
in which Congress and the president will reach a fatal impasse, failing to 
agree to increase the debt ceiling when obligations come due. This 
would, for the first time, put the United States government in the posi-
tion of being politically and legally unable to pay what it has promised to 
pay—even when there is no economic barrier to doing so. 
C. The Applicability or Irrelevance of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
If we reach such an impasse, it will become impossible for the presi-
dent to honor his responsibilities under the Constitution to faithfully 
execute the laws of the United States. One way to view the problem, 
should such a crisis arise, is to say that the existence of the debt ceiling 
law itself creates the impasse, where none need exist. Without the debt 
                                                                                                                 
61. See Jonathan Weisman, Republicans Pledge New Standoff on Debt Limit, N.Y. 
Times, May 16, 2012, at A1 (reporting House Speaker John A. Boehner’s vow “to hold up 
another increase in the federal debt ceiling unless it was offset by larger spending cuts”). 
62. See Budget Control Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-25, § 302(a), 125 Stat. 240, 256–
57 (covering deficit reduction); Alan Silverleib & Tom Cohen, White House, 
Congressional Leaders Reach Debt Deal, CNN (July 31, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/
2011-07-31/politics/debt.talks_1_debt-ceiling-debt-deal-deficit-reduction (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (summarizing terms of debt ceiling deal). 
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ceiling, after all, the president could simply collect the revenues implied 
by the tax law, expend the funds implied by the appropriations laws, and 
borrow any necessary additional funds as authorized by Congress.63 
In this vein, some commentary emerged during the summer of 2011, 
suggesting not only that the debt ceiling statute is an unnecessary (and 
needlessly dangerous) law, but that its existence might violate the 
Constitution.64 Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment states, in 
pertinent part, “[t]he validity of the public debt of the United States, 
authorized by law . . . shall not be questioned.”65 Under one plausible 
reading of that provision, the debt ceiling statute—because it raises the 
possibility that the United States will fail to meet some of its legal obliga-
tions to pay money, as promised under the law—will bring the validity of 
the debt of the United States into question. If that is true, then the con-
stitutional provision invalidates the statutory enactment, and the debt 
ceiling statute must be deemed invalid. The president would then ignore 
the debt ceiling and order the Treasury Department to issue debt other-
wise authorized by Congress. This reading of the Constitution, as noted 
in the Introduction above, has become known as “the nuclear option.”66 
Although this interpretation is not the only plausible reading of 
Section 4, and although (as we discuss below) it is ultimately only one 
way to conclude that the debt ceiling must be set aside, there is much to 
be said for it. The difficulty is in defining the word “questioned” in a lim-
ited and meaningful way. The only guidance on this question from the 
Supreme Court was issued during the Great Depression, in Perry v. United 
States.67 Perry was a challenge to a federal law that purported to supersede 
federal bond provisions entitling the bondholders to be paid principal 
and interest in gold.68 Although the Court found that Perry was not 
entitled to the particular relief he sought, en route to that holding, Chief 
Justice Hughes declared that Congress was constitutionally forbidden 
                                                                                                                 
63. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.  
64. See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. H5295–96 (daily ed. July 21, 2011) (statement of Rep. 
Sheila Jackson Lee) (questioning constitutionality of debt limit); Jonathan H. Adler, Is the 
Debt Limit Constitutional—Part Deux, Volokh Conspiracy (July 3, 2011, 1:09 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2011/07/03/is-the-debt-limit-constitutional-part-deux/ (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (summarizing academic debate around constitutionality of debt 
ceiling); Jack Balkin, The Legislative History of Section Four of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Balkinization (June 30, 2011, 1:59 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/
06/legislative-history-of-section-four-of.html [hereinafter Balkin, Section Four] (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review); Garrett Epps, The Speech Obama Could Give: “The 
Constitution Forbids Default,” Atlantic (Apr. 28, 2011, 3:56 PM), http://www.theatlantic
.com/politics/archive/2011/04/the-speech-obama-could-give-the-constitution-forbids-
default/237977/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting federal default would 
be unconstitutional). 
65. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4.  
66. See supra notes 5--7 and accompanying text.  
67. 294 U.S. 330 (1935). 
68. Id. at 346–47. 
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from retroactively altering the terms of its debt instruments.69 The Chief 
Justice placed some reliance on Section 4 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. He wrote, 
We regard [Section 4] as confirmatory of a fundamental prin-
ciple, which applies as well to the government bonds in 
question, and to others duly authorized by the Congress, as to 
those issued before the Amendment was adopted. Nor can we 
perceive any reason for not considering the expression “the 
validity of the public debt” as embracing whatever concerns the 
integrity of the public obligations.70 
This language from Perry offers a broad reading of Section 4 that 
suggests that the validity of the debt of the United States is brought into 
question whenever the government acts, or threatens to act, in a way that 
suggests that it will not honor all of its obligations. This statement recog-
nizes the possibility (indeed, the likelihood) that holders of federal 
debt—that is, the people who have loaned money to the United States—
will have reason to seriously question whether the United States will 
repay the money that it borrowed if they see that the federal government 
has failed to live up to its other obligations. Even if the government is 
currently paying all interest and principal on existing government debts, 
current and potential lenders will have reason to question the validity of 
the debt if, for example, they observe the federal government refusing to 
pay promised Social Security benefits or refusing to reimburse a vendor 
for services rendered to the Defense Department. 
Under this view, then, the debt ceiling is constitutionally infirm, at 
least as applied during a politically manufactured standoff, because its 
existence causes the public reasonably to question whether the federal 
government will soon choose not to honor its debt commitments. A 
court that strikes down the debt ceiling statute or a president who 
ignores it, under this reading, can guarantee that the commitments 
made by the government in its duly enacted annual budget will be met. 
Although we have considerable sympathy for the “nuclear option,” 
we recognize that the reading of Section 4 that underlies it is debatable. 
The quoted language from Perry, though appearing in the controlling 
opinion of the case, was not endorsed by a majority of the Justices of the 
Court.71 It is, therefore, arguably dicta. While we are persuaded that the 
quoted language is correct on the merits—that is, that it is dangerously 
shortsighted not to suspect that any defaulted obligation will bring into 
                                                                                                                 
69. Id. at 351–52. 
70. Id. at 354. 
71. The case was decided by a 5-4 vote. Although Justice Stone nominally concurred, 
rather than concurring only in the judgment, he wrote separately to indicate that he did 
not endorse the portion of the majority opinion in which the discussion of Section 4 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment appeared. See id. at 359 (Stone, J., concurring). 
2012] LESSONS OF THE DEBT CEILING STANDOFF 1191 
 
question the validity of the public debt—the Supreme Court has not 
definitively endorsed that view in a legally binding fashion. 
In addition, it is plausible to argue that Section 4 should be inter-
preted narrowly, especially in light of the circumstances surrounding its 
enactment in the aftermath of the Civil War.72 Read in that context, 
Section 4 chiefly targets the worry that, once fully readmitted to the 
Union, senators and representatives from Southern states (not to men-
tion President Andrew Johnson) would deliberately refuse to repay debts 
incurred in suppressing the Confederate rebellion.73 One might concede 
that Section 4’s literal language does not limit the provision’s application 
to Civil War debts but nonetheless take a narrow view of what constitutes 
“questioning” or “public debt” by, for example, treating government 
failure to pay vendors for services rendered or entitlement beneficiaries 
their statutory benefits as outside the scope of the Amendment.74 Under 
an extremely narrow view, even worried bondholders would not be said 
to “question” the validity of the debt within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment unless they were told directly that the govern-
                                                                                                                 
72. See Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, supra note 20, at 581 n.94 (noting 
narrowest possible construction of Section 4 would limit it to Civil War debt only).  
73. See id. at 582–87 (considering but rejecting this narrow interpretation of Section 
4); Balkin, Section Four, supra note 64 (“[T]he goal [of Section 4] was to remove threats 
of default of federal debt from partisan struggle.”). 
74. See Abramowicz, Beyond Balanced Budgets, supra note 20, at 582–87 (suggesting 
general applicability of Section 4 to non-Civil War debts). Careful readers of this Article 
and our prior, popular writings on the debt ceiling crisis will note that our position on the 
meaning of Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment has evolved somewhat. We attribute 
that evolution in significant part to our enlightening exchange with Professor Tribe. 
Nonetheless, we continue to think that there is more to the broad reading advanced in 
Perry than Professor Tribe’s writings suggest. For example, Professor Tribe wrote that 
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960), supports the conclusion that Section 4 does not 
protect Social Security recipients against having their benefits reduced. Laurence H. 
Tribe, Guest Post on the Debt Ceiling by Laurence Tribe, Dorf on L. (July 16, 2011, 5:33 
PM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2011/07/guest-post-on-debt-ceiling-by-laurence.html 
[hereinafter Tribe, Debt Ceiling] (on file with the Columbia Law Review). That is a fair 
point, but a limited one, for at least three reasons. First, Flemming itself distinguished 
between mere benefits and contractual obligations, 363 U.S. at 610, and could therefore 
be read to provide support for more than the minimal meaning of Section 4 as applicable 
only to bonds. Second, the contract/benefit distinction drawn in the 5-4 ruling in Flemming 
may have been at least partly undermined by the later ruling in Mathews v. Eldridge, which 
treated Social Security benefits as protected property interests for procedural due process 
purposes. 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). Although procedural due process does not invariably 
protect against legislative abolition of the underlying property interest, the erosion of the 
contract/benefit distinction in the procedural context could have implications for its 
continued vitality in other contexts. Hence, even in a case like Flemming, Social Security 
benefits might now fall on the protected side of the line. Third, taken on its terms, 
Flemming did not decide any issue under Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment, of 
which Perry remains the case that comes closest to providing an authoritative construction. 
Although Professor Tribe avers that the Constitution does not use “debt” synonymously 
with “obligations,” the Perry Court did. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
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ment had decided not to pay the principal and interest promised under 
the terms of its debt instruments (which are legally binding contracts).75 
Yet still narrower readings are available. Consider the question of 
whether the “debt” owed to bondholders means the principal alone, or 
the principal plus the interest. The interest payments, after all, only 
become part of the national debt when they are paid, and only if they are 
paid by borrowing money from other lenders. In that way, interest 
payments on the debt are no different from veterans’ benefits, or the 
salaries of FBI agents.76 None are currently owed by the federal govern-
ment, yet all are promised to be paid in the future under contracts 
entered into by the federal government. 
Even the deceptively simple move of stretching the definition of 
“questioned” sufficiently to sweep interest payments into Section 4 is, 
therefore, a nontrivial interpretive exercise. We must either allow the 
Perry language to have some force, or we absurdly reduce the meaning of 
Section 4 to the point where even holders of government debt can be the 
victims of contractual breach without ever questioning the validity of the 
debt. This reductio suggests that the Perry language—which gives Section 
4 something like its natural everyday meaning—is most plausible, and 
that the narrower readings are inappropriately cramped. 
Nevertheless, there remains the opposite danger of reading the con-
stitutional provision too broadly. Even if the word “questioned” should 
not be interpreted as narrowly as described above, one can reasonably 
worry that the word’s meaning might be inappropriately expanded to 
include nearly anything that might make people think twice about the 
federal government’s creditworthiness. Surely it would go too far to find 
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in any situation in which 
Congress seems to be unable to act responsibly. After all, an embarrass-
ing public spectacle on the floor of Congress might make people ques-
tion whether the federal government is run by fools, and thus lead them 
to question whether the government will be forced to default on its debt 
at some future time. But it is unreasonable to say that every embarrassing 
moment on the congressional floor actually violates Section 4 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.77 
                                                                                                                 
75. See Abramowicz, Train Wrecks, supra note 20, at 23 (noting under one 
interpretation of Section 4 validity of public debt is only questioned upon nonpayment); 
Stern, supra note 21 (arguing more than possible default is required before “validity of 
public debt” is questioned).  
76. Cf. Abramowicz, Train Wrecks, supra note 20, at 43–45 (arguing that reading 
Public Debt Clause to protect entitlements may “begin[] to stretch the Clause’s 
meaning”).  
77. It would be even more unreasonable to argue that private actors could be said to 
violate Section 4 by questioning the government’s ability to repay its debts, even though 
the literal language of Section 4 uses the passive voice in a way that could be interpreted to 
apply to anybody who questions the validity of the public debt, such as a newspaper 
columnist who writes that the government might default. Our conclusion on this point is 
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Even under a less expansive reading of Section 4, however, there are 
still arguments that are simply wrong. For example, economic libertari-
ans might argue that the issuance of debt itself could be seen to violate 
Section 4, because to issue debt is to raise the possibility that it will not be 
repaid. The practical import of that argument is that any increases in pub-
lic debt (that is, new borrowing to cover new deficits) bring into question 
the validity of the public debt by making it possible that the government 
will not be able to repay the debt.78 This argument suggests that, even in 
the absence of the debt ceiling, it is possible for the federal government 
to issue so much debt that it will someday be forced to default.79 
This reasoning is flawed, for a very simple reason. All current United 
States debt is denominated in dollars, which the federal government 
alone is empowered to create.80 Therefore, when the federal government 
issues new debt, lenders know that they will be repaid with dollars, and 
that the entity to which they loaned money can create those dollars as its 
own means of repayment.81 That is why, until the summer of 2011, finan-
cial markets treated United States debt securities as the equivalent of 
cash.82 When a security denominated in dollars is backed by the full faith 
and credit of the United States, there should be no risk of default.83  
                                                                                                                 
not driven strictly by the constitutional text, however. After all, the only other provision of 
the Constitution that uses the locution “shall not be questioned” is the Speech or Debate 
Clause of Article I, Section 6, and that provision has been held to shield senators and 
representatives against private civil actions. See Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 
U.S. 491, 502–03 (1975) (“[T]he Clause provides protection against civil as well as 
criminal actions, and against actions brought by private individuals . . . .”). By extension, 
the same locution in Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment could also be read to 
protect the validity of the public debt even against private questioning. Nonetheless, such 
a reading, which would work a partial sub silentio repeal of the First Amendment, strikes 
us as beyond the realm of plausibility. 
78. See Ron Paul, Default Now, or Suffer a More Expensive Crisis Later, Bloomberg 
(July 22, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-22/default-now-or-
suffer-a-more-expensive-crisis-later-ron-paul.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(arguing government has already exceeded its capability ever to repay its debt).  
79. See id. (“Unless major changes are made today, the U.S. will default on its debt 
sooner or later . . . .”). 
80. See 31 U.S.C. § 5118(c)(3) (2006). The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 forbade 
issuance of U.S. government obligations repayable in gold, although foreign central banks 
were still able to exchange dollars held for gold. Pub. L. No. 73-87, 48 Stat. 337. The 
Nixon Administration ended the latter practice in 1971. See David M. Andrews, 
International Monetary Power 25 (2006). By contrast, the bonds at issue in Perry were 
payable in gold. 294 U.S. 330, 347 (1935). 
81. 31 U.S.C. § 5114 (authorizing Treasury to print money). Additional power to 
expand the money supply rests with the Federal Reserve System. See Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Purposes & Functions 16–18 (9th ed. 2005) [hereinafter Fed. Reserve Sys., Purposes], 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (describing powers Federal Reserve uses to affect monetary supply). 
82. See Francis A. Longstaff, The Flight-to-Liquidity Premium in U.S. Treasury Bond 
Prices, 77 J. Bus. 511, 512 (2004) (noting high liquidity of U.S. Treasury bonds).  
83. Id. at 525. 
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There are, of course, policy and prudential reasons why a govern-
ment might not wish to embark on a path that will require the creation 
of too much money, which is why all debt securities (public and private) 
face inflation risk.84 Until now, however, only federal debt securities have 
carried no default risk.85 Here, the key term from Section 4 is not “ques-
tioned” but rather “validity.” As a technical economic matter, the validity 
of the debt securities of the United States is beyond question, unless 
Congress arbitrarily prevents the Treasury from doing what is necessary 
to honor those debts by imposing a binding debt ceiling. 
In short, despite a legitimate range of reasonable disagreement over 
the meaning of Section 4, we think it is best read as obligating the federal 
government to pay all of its obligations but not limiting federal borrow-
ing. Thus, during an impasse of the sort that was narrowly avoided in 
August 2011, Section 4 would require the president to refuse to honor 
the debt ceiling if doing so would cause the government to fail to meet 
any of its financial obligations in a timely manner. But, as we now 
explain, a presidential decision to avoid violating Section 4 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment would not necessarily ensure that the president 
avoided violating other constitutional obligations. 
D. Is the Debt Ceiling Really the Source of the Problem? 
Notwithstanding the controversy over the meaning of Section 4 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, there is an independent argument—one 
that does not rely upon the Fourteenth Amendment at all—that leads to 
the conclusion that a president must violate the debt ceiling in order to 
carry out the terms of the annual budget. 
In his popular writings about the debt ceiling crisis during the 
summer of 2011, Professor Tribe pointed out that the debate might have 
been inappropriately focused on the debt ceiling law in isolation, rather 
than viewed in the broader context in which the debt ceiling might be-
come binding.86 If we conceive of the annual budget process as creating 
two laws—a tax law and a spending law—then it is not the debt ceiling 
alone that causes any Fourteenth Amendment problem, but rather the 
arithmetic implications of the three laws in combination87: the difference 
                                                                                                                 
84. See Suresh Sundaresan, Fixed Income Markets and Their Derivatives 19–20 (3d 
ed. 2009) (noting “[m]ost debt securities carry the risk of inflation,” even those indexed to 
inflation).  
85. See Timothy W. Koch & S. Scott MacDonald, Bank Management 493 (7th ed. 
2010) (noting even full faith and credit municipal bonds and securities backed by 
Treasuries are still assigned default risk).  
86. See Tribe, Debt Ceiling, supra note 74 (highlighting narrow view embraced by 
most parties to debt ceiling debate).  
87. For simplicity, we refer in the text to three laws, but we have in mind three kinds 
of laws, because the levels of spending and taxation are themselves set by the interaction of 
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between tax collections and expenditures, relative to any remaining 
room for borrowing under the debt ceiling.88 
Under this view, even if one accepts our Perry-based argument above 
regarding the meaning of “questioning” the validity of the debt, it is 
wrong to blame the debt ceiling specifically for any problems that arise 
during a budget stalemate. We could, for example, say that the tax law 
violates the Constitution, because it fails to collect sufficient revenues to 
make an increase in the debt ceiling unnecessary. Similarly, the spending 
law brings the validity of the debt into question, by obligating the govern-
ment to spend more money than it can raise from authorized taxation 
and authorized borrowing. 
There is, as we discuss further in Part II below, much to this argu-
ment. Even so, it is worth considering the unique nature of the debt ceil-
ing law, to determine whether there is anything to the idea that there is a 
unique problem with the debt ceiling that would make it—and it alone—
constitutionally problematic. 
As noted earlier, the debt ceiling is a relatively recent invention.89 
The nation existed for well over a century without a debt ceiling, passing 
annual budgets that combined taxes and spending in various amounts. 
Although the federal government and its debt were both relatively small 
during that time period, the federal debt did exist, and it did fluctuate 
over time in response to differences in taxing and spending. 
The debt ceiling, therefore, is an appendage that was added to the 
system long after the federal government began operating successfully. 
To be sure, fiscal conservatives may view the debt ceiling as a very useful 
appendage. Each time the debt approaches the debt ceiling, citizens and 
politicians who believe that government is too large can use that fact to 
impose what they view as fiscal discipline in two ways: First, as in the 2011 
impasse, they can demand concessions from their political adversaries as 
the price of agreeing to raise the debt ceiling; and second, they can make 
their case to the public that the need to raise the debt ceiling reflects 
government profligacy. Nevermind that the charge need not be true. 
Even if the ratio of debt to GDP shrinks, and even if the government only 
runs deficits that are sustainable over the long term, economic growth 
will mean that Congress repeatedly runs up against the limit of the 
dollar-denominated debt ceiling. The important point is that the debt 
ceiling is a visible and useful tool for imposing fiscal austerity—whether 
needed or not. And so, for those who believe that fiscal austerity is 
needed, the debt ceiling may serve an important function. 
                                                                                                                 
the annual budget law, preexisting statutes governing mandatory spending, and all of the 
complexities of the Internal Revenue Code. 
88. See Tribe, Debt Ceiling, supra note 74 (discussing relation of these three laws 
and how, in combination, they create constitutional problem).  
89. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
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But even granting that, the debt ceiling is hardly essential for impos-
ing fiscal austerity. As noted above, fiscal austerity, or any other plausible 
policy goal that the debt ceiling might help to accomplish, can be 
achieved in the absence of the debt ceiling.90 If Congress and the presi-
dent think that the debt is too high, then they can combine tax increases 
and spending reductions to address that concern.  
By contrast, the federal government could not function without 
spending laws and tax laws. Those laws must be specific enough to allow 
the executive branch to know how to spend money, and from whom to 
collect how much in revenues. Allowing the debt ceiling to override one 
or both of the tax and spending laws would therefore create a legal 
vacuum, leaving the executive branch without guidance from the legisla-
tive branch about how to change taxes or spending while maintaining a 
level of debt below the ceiling.91 
We do not, however, view this argument as essential to our ultimate 
conclusion. While there are strong reasons to view the debt ceiling as a 
“lesser” law than the tax and spending laws, it is sufficient for our pur-
poses to accept Professor Tribe’s point that there is an interaction 
problem among the laws.92 And as we explain in the next Part, the 
problem is not simply that the laws conflict, but that they conflict in a way 
that gives the president no constitutional options. Once one recognizes 
that a president cannot simultaneously carry out all three laws without 
violating the Constitution, it is necessary to determine how a president 
should decide which law to set aside. With nothing but unconstitutional 
choices, what should a president do? 
II. THE PRESIDENT’S TRILEMMA: WHICH DUTY MUST HE IGNORE WHEN HE 
FACES THREE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES? 
The interaction of the spending law, the tax law, and the debt 
ceiling law potentially creates an unsolvable problem. For example, if 
Congress were to authorize spending that exceeds tax collections by one 
trillion dollars in a year, at a time when the existing federal debt is only 
one-half trillion dollars below its statutory ceiling, then the president 
could not execute all three laws as written. Faced with that impossible 
choice, the president risks acting unconstitutionally no matter what he 
might do, because he will have failed to execute at least one duly enacted 
                                                                                                                 
90. See supra text accompanying notes 43–46. 
91. Congress could specify, in advance, how taxes should be increased or spending 
reduced, in the event that the debt ceiling kicks in, through “fallback” provisions in the 
relevant statutes. See Michael C. Dorf, Fallback Law, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 303, 304–10 
(2007) (discussing policy and constitutional implications of fallback provisions). But 
Congress has not done so. 
92. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text. 
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law of the United States.93 He thus faces a “trilemma”: a choice between 
three bad options, all of which are unconstitutional.94 While it is also 
possible for the president to combine unilateral actions on taxes, spend-
ing, and debt—thus potentially violating three separate provisions of the 
Constitution simultaneously—we find it more useful to discuss the three 
separately. This Part offers constitutional and prudential grounds in sup-
port of the conclusion that, faced with the trilemma, the president 
should set aside the debt ceiling law. Then Part III draws broader lessons 
about the criteria the president and other actors should use for choosing 
among unconstitutional options. 
A. Three Powers Reserved to Congress 
Article I of the Constitution grants to Congress, rather than to the 
president, all three powers at play in this debate: taxing, spending, and 
borrowing.95 Under Section 8, Congress has “Power To lay and collect 
Taxes,” to “borrow Money on the credit of the United States,” and to 
“provide for the . . . general Welfare” through the expenditure of 
money.96 
While there are timeless controversies over the extent of Congress’s 
powers under Article I,97 the point here is that any such powers are in 
Congress’s hands, not the president’s, at least absent a valid delegation 
                                                                                                                 
93. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 3 (stating president shall “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed”). As Representative John Vining put it,  
What are [the president’s] duties? To see the laws faithfully executed; if he does 
not do this effectually, he is responsible. To whom? To the people. Have they the 
means of calling him to account, and punishing him for neglect? They have 
secured it in the Constitution, by impeachment, to be presented by their 
immediate representatives . . . . 
Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Interaction Between Impeachment and the Independent Counsel 
Statute, 86 Geo. L.J. 2193, 2203 (1998) (quoting 1 Annals of Cong. 594 (1789) (Joseph 
Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. John Vining)). 
94. As noted in the Introduction, we are aware that there are some plausibly 
constitutional methods by which the president could raise money to finance the difference 
between spending and taxes. See supra notes 20--22. Selling national parks, selling options 
to the Federal Reserve, and similar ideas are innovative and clever, but they strike us as 
perfect examples of the type of action most directly implicating at least the spirit of 
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment. That is, if the president were seen selling Alaska 
back to the Russians, or minting large platinum coins, or anything along those lines, then 
any reasonable person would question the validity of the debt of the United States. No 
functioning government could engage in such Hail Mary desperation plays without 
undermining public confidence in all of its finances, perhaps fatally. As we explain below, 
even if such tactics were deemed constitutionally valid, the government should not have to 
try them if they would bring about financial ruin. See infra Part III.C. 
95. U.S. Const. art. I. 
96. Id. art. I, § 8. 
97. See Gerard N. Magliocca, A New Approach to Congressional Power: Revisiting 
the Legal Tender Cases, 95 Geo. L.J. 119, 120 (2006) (noting question of “the scope of 
Congress’s enumerated powers is . . . constitutional law’s oldest debate”).  
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by Congress to the president. For a president to choose unilaterally to 
collect taxes in a way not authorized by Congress, or to spend money in a 
way not authorized by Congress, or to borrow money in amounts not au-
thorized by Congress, violates the separation of powers enshrined in the 
Constitution.98 
If Congress, either by choice or by default, puts the president in the 
position of having to violate his oath of office, how should the president 
proceed? The most aggressive approach would be for the president 
simply to assume all powers otherwise reserved to Congress, on the 
theory that he cannot be expected to obey the contradictory dictates of a 
dysfunctional body. 
But this framing of the question may be misleading. Congress does 
not act alone, and so the president may share responsibility for its dys-
function. Did the president sign the budget bill that put Congress on a 
collision course with the debt ceiling? Did he threaten to veto a bill rais-
ing the debt ceiling if it contained (or did not contain) some other 
provision he disapproved (or insisted upon)? The trilemma occurs as a 
result of a systemic failure rather than simply congressional dysfunction.  
Moreover, as we elaborate at greater length in Part III, even if the 
president bears no substantial responsibility for the trilemma, he should 
follow the path that would do the least violence to the constitutional pre-
rogatives of Congress. In other words, the president should engage in the 
most minimal course of action possible and do everything practicable to 
allow Congress later to undo what he has done, if Congress ultimately 
determines that the president’s extraordinary (but necessary) exercise of 
power was unwise. 
This analysis suggests that Congress itself could provide guidance 
regarding its priorities among the three possible courses of action, 
explaining or revealing which of the three powers it cares about the least. 
Naturally, any such analysis is comparative, because Congress should 
rightly be concerned about guarding all of its enumerated powers. 
Moreover, these three powers are all highly valued and closely guarded 
legislative prerogatives. The question is not which choice is best, but 
which is least bad. 
Among the three possibilities, the taxing power would seem to be 
the most important power reserved to Congress.99 From the founding, 
the notion of limited government was, in significant part, a commitment 
                                                                                                                 
98. “When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of 
authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers,” which do not include 
those powers expressly granted by Article I, Section 8, to Congress. Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).  
99. See, e.g., Tucker v. Ferguson, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 527, 575 (1874) (“The taxing 
power is vital to the functions of government. It helps to sustain the social compact and to 
give it efficacy. It is intended to promote the general welfare. It reaches the interests of 
every member of the community.”).  
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to a limitation on the power to tax.100 “No taxation without repre-
sentation” is only the most memorable of the expressions of this idea, 
reserving to the people’s representatives the power to collect taxes.101 
That power is also the first of Congress’s powers listed in Section 8 of 
Article I.102 Certainly, we are unaware of any situation in which a presi-
dent has attempted to collect taxes without authorization by Congress; 
and it is difficult indeed to imagine any Congress acceding to such a 
usurpation of its powers. 
Regarding the spending power, the picture is a bit more nuanced. In 
the early years of the Republic, Congress passed laws that authorized the 
president to spend “up to” certain sums of money, and the president was 
accordingly able to carry out his constitutional duties while spending 
money in amounts not precisely specified by Congress.103 
In most areas of the federal budget, however, that practice has long 
since ended. Congress now typically specifies precise amounts of money 
(or, in the case of so-called entitlement programs, precise formulae to 
determine amounts of money) that the president must spend for each 
authorized program.104 When Congress appropriates the money neces-
sary to fund those authorized programs, it effectively orders the 
president to spend no more and no less than those amounts. It would be 
odd, indeed, if a president were to assert that he could choose to, say, 
send Medicare beneficiaries (or their medical care providers) less money 
than they would be entitled to receive under the relevant statute. 
Moreover, we need not speculate about what would happen if a 
president were to assert such authority. The impoundment controversy 
during the Nixon Administration involved a direct confrontation be-
                                                                                                                 
100. See Charles Lockhart, American and Swedish Tax Regimes—Cultural and 
Structural Roots, 35 Comp. Pol. 379, 385, 391–92 (2003) (explaining United States’ tax 
revenues remain low in relation to other industrial countries because of historical “fidelity 
to a neo-Lockean conception of limited government” which stems from time of American 
Revolution). 
101. See, e.g., Grant Dorfman, The Founders’ Legal Case: “No Taxation Without 
Representation” Versus Taxation No Tyranny, 44 Hous. L. Rev. 1377, 1378 (2008) (noting 
phrase has become “‘mother’s milk’ of American history education”). 
102. U.S. Const. art. I., § 8. 
103. See Roy E. Brownell II, The Constitutional Status of the President’s 
Impoundment of National Security Funds, 12 Seton Hall Const. L.J. 1, 22–30 (2001) 
(discussing early laws under which “President Washington was given broad discretion over 
appropriations through use of ‘lump-sum’ appropriations” to expend funds or leave funds 
unexpended as he saw fit). 
104. Cf. W. Cent. Mo. Rural Dev. Corp. v. Donovan, 659 F.2d 199, 202 (D.C. Cir. 
1981) (rejecting challenge to presidential deferral of spending of allocated funds on 
ground that it was merely temporary, and thus not in contravention of statutory 
requirement that funds be spent). For further discussion of direct-spending legislation 
and entitlement programs, see Schick, supra note 31, at 57--81 (discussing tactics to reduce 
discretionary spending and Clinton’s efforts to thwart cuts in entitlement programs in 
1995–1996 budget). 
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tween the executive and legislative branches, with Congress objecting to 
Nixon’s theory of an “imperial presidency,” in which the president would 
have the power to selectively reduce certain spending programs at his 
discretion.105 
The result was the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, under which 
the president may only propose “rescissions” of appropriated spend-
ing.106 Congress, however, need not act on such proposals, and the 
president’s power to withhold funds ends after forty-five days.107 
Congress, therefore, has made a strong statement of principle, affirming 
its power under the Constitution to set the exact sums of money to be 
spent on each program, not merely the upper limits. 
Arguably, moreover, the Impoundment Control Act was unnecessary 
to affirm Congress’s powers. While other provisions of that law have 
surely helped to create mechanisms for resolving disputes among the 
branches, even before Congress acted lower courts invoked the 
Constitution in uniformly ruling against President Nixon’s attempts to 
impound funds.108 Passage of the Act mooted those cases before they 
reached the Supreme Court, but the fundamental idea that the power to 
spend implies the power to spend in exact amounts is persuasive and, in 
our view, also strongly implied by the Supreme Court’s invalidation of 
the Line Item Veto Act in Clinton v. City of New York.109 
For the immediate purpose of determining Congress’s priorities, 
however, it is the passage of the Impoundment Control Act itself that 
provides useful guidance for future controversies. Congress has demon-
                                                                                                                 
105. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency 235–40 (Mariner Books 
2004) (1973) (describing President Nixon’s use of impoundment as instrument of policy); 
Thomas E. Cronin, A Resurgent Congress and the Imperial Presidency, 95 Pol. Sci. Q. 209, 
215–16 (1980) (discussing Nixon’s impounding funds to withhold spending from certain 
programs and Congress’s adverse reaction to his “extensive policymaking”). 
106. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, 2 U.S.C. §§ 681–
688 (2006). See also Cronin, supra note 105, at 221 (noting Congress passed Act partly as 
means of reasserting its authority over budget). 
107. 2 U.S.C. § 683; see Schlesinger, supra note 105, at 477 (describing Congress’s 
discretionary power to act on presidential rescission proposals). 
108. See Schlesinger, supra note 105, at 397 (discussing history of courts ruling 
unanimously against impoundment); see also Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363, 
1372 (D.D.C. 1973) (“It is not within the discretion of the Executive to refuse to execute 
laws passed by Congress but with which the Executive presently disagrees.”), rev’d, 501 F. 
2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 361 F. Supp. 689, 
700 (E.D. Va. 1973) (holding that impoundment of fifty-five percent of funds allocated to 
administration of Water Pollution Control Act was “flagrant abuse of executive discretion” 
and therefore void). 
109. 524 U.S. 417, 449 (1998). Even Justice Scalia, who dissented in Clinton, 
acknowledged that President Nixon was mistaken in his assertion of a constitutional power 
to impound appropriated funds in the teeth of a congressional command to spend those 
funds. Id. at 468 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 
(1975)). 
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strated—both by passing the Act and by refusing to grant subsequent 
presidential rescission requests—that it wishes to guard its power to 
spend against presidential encroachment. 
Finally, what about Congress’s power to authorize the borrowing of 
money? The existence of the debt ceiling law, of course, suggests that 
Congress wishes to limit the amount of money that the government can 
borrow.110 In practice, however, Congress has generally treated the debt 
ceiling as a symbolic measure or, at most, a bargaining chip of relatively 
little value; prior to 2011, everyone understood that the debt ceiling 
would ultimately be raised. Each time an increase in the debt ceiling has 
been resisted, it has been generally understood that the dollar limit of 
the debt ceiling was being used opportunistically.111 Even President 
Obama, when he served in the Senate, once voted against a debt ceiling 
increase, with no indication that he was doing so because of concerns 
about the specific limit involved.112 Taking a stand on the national debt 
was politically useful, but no one doubted that Congress would ultimately 
raise the debt ceiling. 
Yet this line of reasoning might suggest the importance of the debt 
ceiling in case of a real impasse. That is, if Congress ever actually were to 
refuse to raise the debt ceiling, then that would be an unmistakable 
(albeit surprising) statement that it cares deeply about the level of debt. 
As we argue below, however, it is difficult to reconcile that inference with 
Congress’s having passed tax and spending laws that would otherwise 
require an increase in the debt. 
In any event, we need not stake our argument on the proposition 
that Congress does not care about the debt ceiling. Congress’s refusal to 
change any of the three laws—which is the situation that gives rise to this 
entire analysis—gives us no reason to think that it cares more about its 
power to limit borrowing than about its other powers. At most, through a 
failure to raise the debt ceiling, Congress could be read to be saying that 
it no longer cares less about protecting its borrowing powers. 
It is not surprising that reading Congress’s collective mind regarding 
these foundational principles is difficult. Each specific power granted to 
Congress under the Constitution is important on its own merits. As a 
comparative matter, however, it is difficult not to view the debt ceiling as 
                                                                                                                 
110. See 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006) (establishing public debt limit). 
111. See Anita S. Krishnakumar, In Defense of the Debt Limit Statute, 42 Harv. J. on 
Legis. 135, 156 (2005) (stating Congress has used “votes on debt limit increase 
legislation . . . as a vehicle for passage of budget-reform or other unrelated legislation”). 
The debt ceiling law has been treated “as a dangerous ‘weapon’ used by Congress to force 
the President to make uncomfortable compromises on issues unrelated to the debt.” Id. at 
138, n.18.  
112. See 152 Cong. Rec. 3845 (2006) (listing then-Senator Obama as voting “Nay” on 
H.R.J. Res. 47, 109th Cong. (2006)). 
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the least important manifestation of Congress’s efforts to protect its 
prerogatives. 
B. Rules of Interpretation, As Applied to the Debt Ceiling Controversy 
When legal provisions are in conflict, or in cases of ambiguity, vari-
ous interpretive doctrines may be available to resolve the issues at stake. 
One such tool is the principle of constitutional avoidance. Perhaps the 
various acts of Congress can be collectively construed to avoid the 
conclusion that the President was obligated to execute some unconstitu-
tional law. Perhaps the budget that Congress enacted in the spring of 
2011 impliedly repealed the debt ceiling limit. If so, then the President 
would not have faced a trilemma at all. Ignoring the debt ceiling would 
have been the right choice because the debt ceiling would no longer 
exist. 
Yet, as a judicial doctrine, constitutional avoidance only operates to 
permit the selection of a “plausible” construction of a statute.113 We see 
no reason why constitutional avoidance should be applied any more 
broadly by the executive branch.114 The reason why courts will not unduly 
strain statutory text to avoid a constitutional question is to preserve 
Congress’s primacy in legislation. That primacy is threatened by execu-
tive bending of the law no less than by judicial bending. Accordingly, we 
think the president must ask the same question that a court would ask to 
determine whether constitutional avoidance enables the conclusion that 
the budget law impliedly repealed the debt ceiling: is that a plausible 
reading of the budget law? 
Although we favor repeal of the debt ceiling on policy grounds, we 
do not think that Congress’s adoption of a budget in 2011 can plausibly 
be read as having impliedly repealed the debt ceiling. If the enactment of 
a budget in which spending will eventually exceed revenues by an 
amount greater than the room remaining under the debt ceiling acts as a 
tacit repeal of the debt ceiling, then the debt ceiling will have been read 
to do literally nothing. After all, the debt ceiling only constrains govern-
ment borrowing in just such circumstances. Accordingly, reading the 
budget law to repeal the debt ceiling law would avoid a constitutional 
question only by violating the canon of statutory construction that 
                                                                                                                 
113. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1333 (2010) 
(quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
114. Professor Morrison has argued that in some circumstances constitutional 
avoidance should not apply at all within the executive branch. See Trevor W. Morrison, 
Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1189, 1239–58 
(2006) (pointing to institutional advantages that render statutes relatively unambiguous 
for executive branch actors). But we know of no argument for the executive applying the 
principle of constitutional avoidance more broadly than courts apply it. 
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instructs courts to “disfavor interpretations of statutes that render 
language superfluous.”115 
In addition, there is a longstanding canon of statutory construction 
disfavoring repeal by implication, absent “clear and manifest” evidence of 
legislative intent.116 Yet there is essentially no evidence in the budget act 
itself or anywhere else that Congress, in passing the budget, intended to 
repeal the debt ceiling. When Congress passed the budget in 2011, it did 
so knowing that every other time it had passed a budget that required 
borrowing beyond the debt ceiling, further legislation was subsequently 
enacted raising the debt ceiling. Against that background, it is not 
plausible to conclude that Congress thought—but did not say in the leg-
islation or anywhere else—that this time things were different. 
If canons of construction cannot dissolve the trilemma, they may 
nonetheless provide the president with guidance about Congress’s priori-
ties—and thus enable him to choose an unconstitutional course that 
minimizes the frustration of those priorities. As we now explain, the two 
most useful doctrines both point in the same direction, suggesting that 
the debt ceiling should give way when it is in conflict with the taxing and 
spending provisions of the government’s budget. 
The “last in time” rule suggests that Congress’s most recent enact-
ments provide the best guide to its priorities.117 Congress legislates in 
light of existing law, and thus it presumably knows when it is passing new 
legislation that would make it impossible for the president to meet his 
obligations under both the older and newly enacted laws. 
In the case of the debt ceiling, Congress in spring 2011 passed a 
budget.118 According to all estimates available at the time, that budget 
implied that the government would reach its official debt limit in May; all 
of the executive branch’s legally permissible delaying tactics (such as 
temporarily suspending reinvestment of certain government funds) 
would be exhausted by early August, before the end of the fiscal year.119 
                                                                                                                 
115. Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992). 
116. See Hui v. Castenada, 130 S. Ct. 1845, 1853 (2010) (citing Hawaii v. Office of 
Haw. Affairs, 556 U.S. 163, 175 (2009)). 
117. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (noting when two legal 
instruments conflict, “the one last in date will control the other”); Boudette v. Barnette, 
923 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1991) (“When two statutes conflict the general rule is that the 
statute last in time prevails as the most recent expression of the legislature’s will.”).  
118. See Janet Hook, Congress Puts Haggling Aside to Pass 2011 Budget Bill, Wall St. 
J., Apr. 15, 2011, at A5 (describing months of congressional conflicts leading up to passage 
of 2011 budget).  
119. See James Risen, Debt Ceiling Increase Is Expected, Geithner Says, N.Y. Times, 
Apr. 18, 2011, at A14 (“The administration says the legal debt limit, now just over $14 
trillion, will be reached [in May]. Many economists have warned that if the ceiling is not 
raised, the United States will soon begin to default on its debt, and that could set off an 
international financial crisis.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury: No 
Change to August 2 Estimate Regarding Exhaustion of U.S. Borrowing Authority (July 1, 
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Yet the budget called for levels of spending and taxes that would require 
increases in the debt to levels beyond the statutory limit.120 If the last-in-
time doctrine has any purchase here, it leads to the conclusion that, if 
push came to shove, Congress must not have wanted the President to en-
force the debt ceiling as much as it wanted the President to tax and 
spend in accordance with the budget. If Congress had cared enough 
about the debt ceiling, it had all of the tools necessary to avoid a conflict 
that would lead to the President’s trilemma. 
Another useful interpretive doctrine states that “the specific domi-
nates the general.”121 This maxim captures the idea that general statutes 
adopt policy goals that have some weight, but that drafters of statutes 
legislate in more detail when they mean to specify a particular result. If 
the general statutes can be carried out without conflicting with other 
laws, then they must be followed. If not, however, then Congress’s atten-
tion to detail should trump its more general statements. 
Of course, the debt ceiling is in one sense very specific. It states a 
precise number beyond which the national debt may not rise.122 But the 
taxing and spending laws are much more specific than the debt ceiling 
statute in that they express congressional will on a host of specific details, 
rather than just one aggregate number. For the reasons discussed in Part 
II.D below, that specificity should strongly point the president towards 
setting aside the debt ceiling when he is faced with the trilemma. To put 
the point briefly, the legislative effort inherent in the taxing and spend-
ing laws represents such a delicate balancing act that we must presume 
that Congress’s intent would be frustrated to a much greater degree by a 
president who elevates the blunt instrument of the debt ceiling above 
those other, highly nuanced laws, than by a president who subordinates 
the debt ceiling to Congress’s decisions about spending and taxes. 
But suppose Congress wanted the president to observe a hard debt 
ceiling—one that would prevail over budget and tax laws that called for 
                                                                                                                 
2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/ tg1225
.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Letter from Timothy F. Geithner, Sec’y of the 
Treasury, to Harry Reid, Senate Majority Leader (Apr. 4, 2011) (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (describing tactics available to executive branch in order to delay default). 
120. See Mindy R. Levit et al., Cong. Research Serv., R41633, Reaching the Debt 
Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government Operations 12 (2011) 
[hereinafter 2011 CRS Report], available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization
/157101.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“[T]he federal government will have 
to issue an additional $738 billion in debt on net above the current statutory limit to 
finance all obligations for the remainder of [fiscal year 2013].”). 
121. See, e.g., Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 929 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting 
“more recent and specific statute” controls over general statute); Greene v. United States, 
79 F.3d 1348, 1355 (2d Cir. 1996) (“When two statutes are in conflict, that statute which 
addresses the matter at issue in specific terms controls over a statute which addresses the 
issue in general terms, unless Congress has manifested a contrary aim.”). 
122. 31 U.S.C. § 3101 (2006) (stating federal government may not at any time have 
outstanding debt obligations exceeding $14,294,000,000,000). 
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spending that leaves a shortfall which would otherwise necessitate 
borrowing beyond the debt ceiling. Does our application of the canons 
of construction render such a choice impossible? Hardly. 
If Congress really wanted a hard debt ceiling, it could so specify in 
the debt ceiling and/or its budget and tax bills. For example, the debt 
ceiling statute might state something like the following: 
In the event that any future Act appropriates funds in amounts 
that cannot be paid without borrowing beyond the limits of this 
debt ceiling, such future Act shall be construed to authorize the 
president to decline to spend such sums as he, in his sound dis-
cretion, deems appropriate to impound. 
That sort of debt ceiling law would work a partial repeal of the 
Impoundment Control Act, and if Congress were then to pass a budget 
that required borrowing beyond the debt ceiling, the budget would be 
construed in light of the debt ceiling law as prioritizing spending cuts. 
But in such a scenario, the president would not be cutting spending 
because cutting spending would be less unconstitutional than ignoring the 
debt ceiling; in such a scenario, cutting spending would not be unconstitu-
tional at all (so long as the particular spending cuts did not violate 
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment or some other constitutional 
provision). Put differently, Congress can insist on a hard debt ceiling, but 
it may have difficulty prospectively insisting on a hard debt ceiling as a 
favored unconstitutional option. 
C. Practical Issues Raised by Presidential Unilateralism 
Beyond Congress’s own indications of its priorities, there are practi-
cal questions that arise when considering which of the three powers of 
Congress the president might usurp when faced with a trilemma. Exam-
ining the ease or difficulty of carrying out one or another option might 
offer guidance about the president’s best course of action, thereby 
helping to answer the question of which unconstitutional option is least 
unconstitutional. We return to the question of why such pragmatic con-
siderations bear on the relative measure of unconstitutionality in Part III. 
1. When the President Cuts Spending. — President Obama, along with 
many commentators, concluded in the summer of 2011 that he would be 
forced to violate the Constitution by spending less than Congress had 
authorized and appropriated in the spending law.123 If he had followed 
through, how would that have happened? 
Those who were worried about the validity of the public debt—
either for constitutional reasons or out of concern that failing to pay the 
nation’s creditors could create a financial and economic crisis—
                                                                                                                 
123. Of course, the President did not say that spending less than Congress had 
appropriated would violate the Constitution, but the conclusion follows from our earlier 
discussion of the impoundment controversy. See supra text accompanying notes 103–109. 
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suggested that the president could simply set aside funds to pay those 
obligations that he deemed to be the most important.124 So long as the 
president did not use the opportunity to exact political retribution, or to 
impermissibly target certain groups in a way that would violate equal 
protection, this approach would simply entrust to the president the 
power to decide who should not be paid. 
As it turns out, however, doing so would be surprisingly difficult 
under the laws and procedures that usually govern federal spending. 
Because tax revenues arrive at the Treasury daily, in varying amounts, the 
government’s ability to pay its bills without borrowing will depend on 
which bills happen to come due on the days when the government 
happens to be collecting sufficient tax revenues.125 A Social Security 
check that could not be paid on Tuesday might be payable on 
Wednesday. However, even if the Tuesday payment is not made, there 
will be other payments that are due on Wednesday. If the amount of tax 
revenue coming in during Wednesday would be enough to pay 
Wednesday’s bills, but not both Tuesday’s carryovers plus Wednesday’s 
bills, then someone will still not be paid. 
Under current law, if the government has enough money in the 
Treasury on any given day to pay the bills that are then due, it must pay 
those bills.126 The debt ceiling does not override that requirement, 
because there would be (by assumption) sufficient non-borrowed funds 
to cover the day’s required expenditure. If the president tried to argue 
that he must prioritize the older unpaid bills over the current bills, 
Wednesday’s would-be recipients could reasonably argue that there is no 
principle under the law that authorizes the president to set priorities in 
that way. Tuesday’s recipients should, under an equally plausible argu-
                                                                                                                 
124. See, e.g., Tom McClintock, Debt Reduction Means Difficult Decisions; Families 
Get What Washington Doesn’t: Live Within Your Means, Wash. Times, July 28, 2011, at B1 
(“President Obama has both the legal authority and constitutional obligation to prioritize 
payments to prevent a default. The problem is that a lot of other bills would go 
unpaid . . . .”); see also 2011 CRS Report, supra note 120, at 13 (discussing different 
legislation proposals made by congressmen that would prioritize payment of certain 
obligations, such as principal and interest on debt or Social Security benefits, over other 
obligations).  
125. The Financial Management Service publishes a Daily Treasury Statement that 
reports the amount of revenue received by the Treasury, daily withdrawals, and debt 
transactions on a given day. See Overview, Daily Treasury Statement, Fin. Mgmt. Serv., 
www.fms.treas.gov/dts/overview.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last updated 
Dec. 4, 2009). 
126. See Mindy R. Levit et al., Cong. Research Serv., R41633, Reaching the Debt 
Limit: Background and Potential Effects on Government Operations 8 (2012) [hereinafter 
2012 CRS Report], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41633.pdf (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (stating U.S. Treasury is required “to make payments on 
obligations as they come due” because it “lacks formal legal authority to establish priorities 
to pay obligations”); see also Binyamin Appelbaum, Treasury Prioritizing Payments, N.Y. 
Times, July 28, 2011, at B6 (noting Social Security benefits might go unpaid if debt limit is 
reached because of requirement that Treasury make payments as they become due). 
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ment, be out of luck until there is enough money to pay a particular 
day’s recipients plus all unpaid carryover bills. And if such a day never 
comes, then there is no reason why the earlier obligations are more bind-
ing than the later ones. The short-term timing of these payment streams 
is, in most cases, a matter of happenstance. 
The analysis could also be affected by the nature of the payments 
that are due. In some cases, a day’s or week’s delay is little more than an 
annoyance, while in others, justice delayed is truly justice denied. For 
example, a person who is owed money by the federal government could 
be relying on that money to fund a down payment on a house, where 
even a day’s delay can be sufficient to unravel an entire sale—or even a 
series of sales, where the seller in one deal expects to use her proceeds to 
become the buyer in a related sale. Again, the nearly random timing of 
the specific payment obligations, in conjunction with the equally random 
timing of tax receipts, suggests that it would be difficult indeed to create 
a principled priority system that forces some recipients to wait while 
others are paid. 
This problem would become even more difficult if the president 
were to try to hoard funds from day to day in anticipation of high-priority 
obligations that are expected to arise in the near future. For example, if 
the president knows that certain interest payments to government bond-
holders will be due on Friday, and he does not expect there to be 
enough money coming in on Friday to cover those payments, he might 
refuse to make payments earlier in the week, even when the concurrent 
flow of tax revenues would otherwise be sufficient to cover the payments 
due on those days. If Treasury is legally required to pay money due when 
it is due, so long as there is money on hand, then certainly the disap-
pointed would-be recipients of those payments could bring actions 
against the government.127 
But, one might ask, wouldn’t the president make these decisions at 
the wholesale level? The president could establish a formula of the 
following sort: Bondholders and military personnel get paid in full; the 
remaining shortfall is then made up by an equal percentage reduction 
among all prospective federal payees based on Treasury’s projection of 
the size of the shortfall. Such an algorithm would not require Treasury or 
the president to decide, at least on a day-by-day basis, whom to pay and 
how much to pay them. 
                                                                                                                 
127. In order to satisfy the Article III requirements for standing, a plaintiff must have 
suffered a “personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct 
and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 
(1984). When “the plaintiff is himself an object of the action (or forgone action) at 
issue . . . there is ordinarily little question that the action or inaction has caused him 
injury, and that a judgment preventing or requiring the action will redress it.” Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992). Suits against the government for 
funds allegedly unlawfully withheld fall into this uncontroversial category. 
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We concede that it is possible to rewrite the laws and procedures to 
allow any set of priorities to be met, but the process of doing so requires 
more changes to the law and to executive procedures than might at first 
be obvious. Moreover, even if the president does not engage in the kinds 
of impermissible favoritism that unilateral spending cuts might allow, 
assumption of the power to choose among decision procedures greatly 
expands the power of the president to make choices that cross the line 
into policy decisions—without any legislation that could fairly be con-
strued as a delegation of that power to him. Setting up rules that protect 
would-be recipients of certain payments, such as the example in the 
previous paragraph, necessarily disfavors others. Congress has delegated 
some limited authority to the president to prioritize certain national 
defense spending,128 and the president has in turn delegated some of 
that authority to federal agencies,129 but those limited delegations merely 
underscore the absence of any broader delegation of prioritization 
authority to the president. For the president to make such choices with-
out prior congressional authorization is for him to assume significant 
legislative power.130 
In short, seemingly simple rules like “across-the-board cuts” or 
“prioritization of bondholders” turn out, on the ground, to be anything 
but simple. Telling the president to pick winners and losers—even if he 
does so in a way that seems to employ a “clean” rule, without the 
apparent exercise of day-to-day discretion—both confers awesome power 
on the president and increases the likelihood of arbitrary harm to 
innocent parties. 
2. When the President Increases Borrowing. — If the president, instead of 
cutting spending, decides to ignore the debt ceiling, how would he pro-
ceed? The issuance of government debt is significantly less complicated 
than the determination of government spending levels, because debt is a 
relatively undifferentiated (and completely monetizable) asset. Whereas 
spending cuts can result in something as serious as missed chemotherapy 
treatments or as inconsequential as delays in reimbursing a person’s 
travel expenses, borrowing money has more predictable and direct con-
sequences. No one is forced to lend money, and the government simply 
borrows as much as it needs to cover its appropriated spending, and no 
more.131 Other than the details of the maturities of the debt instruments, 
the process is straightforward and unremarkable. 
                                                                                                                 
128. See Defense Production Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 84-774, § 101, 64 Stat. 798, 799 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071) (granting president authority to allocate 
resources and set domestic spending priorities in matters of national defense). 
129. See Exec. Order No. 13,603, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,651, 16,652–58 (Mar. 16, 2012). 
130. See supra notes 104–109 and accompanying text (describing limitations 
Congress placed on president’s ability to change budget allocation). 
131. See 2012 CRS Report, supra note 126, at 1–2 (describing drivers of federal 
borrowing). 
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From an administrative standpoint, therefore, the issuance of debt 
poses no difficulties. There are federal employees who regularly go 
through the process of issuing new federal debt, using well-established 
mechanisms to interact with potential lenders in the financial markets.132 
If the president wishes to issue additional debt, even if that debt would 
bring the government’s total borrowing level above the current ceiling, 
he can easily issue an order to do so. The recipients of that order would 
know exactly what to do, without having to make judgment calls, and 
without needing to alter any other laws or procedures that are currently 
in place. 
Consequently, as a practical matter exceeding the debt ceiling is the 
essence of simplicity, especially compared to cutting spending. The more 
difficult practical question, however, is how the potential lenders to the 
United States would react to the offer of new debt securities that appear 
to violate the borrowing clause of Article I, Section 8.133 Would such lend-
ers assume that the new debt is still backed by the full faith and credit of 
the United States, even though only the president has authorized the 
borrowing? 
In part, the answer to this question depends upon the degree of 
political dysfunction that attends the crisis at hand. If it appears that the 
negotiations passed the witching hour by mere bad luck, but that things 
will soon return to normal, then it is easy to imagine that the subsequent 
legislative compromise will include an after-the-fact guarantee of the 
validity of what we will call the “Presidential bonds.” If, however, it 
appears that the political crisis will be longer-lasting, then the risk to 
lenders is higher, making them likely either to refuse to lend, or to re-
quire higher interest payments (thus exacerbating the government’s 
long-term borrowing problems). 
If the government simply defaults up front, however, one would 
expect markets immediately to respond badly, making it more difficult 
and expensive to return the government to its status as a preferred 
borrower.134 Avoiding default by issuing potentially illegitimate debt 
could, on the other hand, lead to the same result.135 The irony, there-
                                                                                                                 
132. The Bureau of the Public Debt is the agency within the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury that issues debt obligations to the public in order to finance government 
operations. This agency handles the sale of government securities on the primary and 
secondary markets. It also auctions about $4.5 trillion in securities annually. See Bureau of 
the Pub. Debt, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 2009–2014, at 8 
(2008), available at http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/whatwedo/bpdstrategicplan09-
14.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing Bureau’s duties and authority). 
133. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 2. 
134. See 2012 CRS Report, supra note 126, at 11–12 (noting default could lead to “a 
downgrade of the U.S. credit rating, an increase in federal and private borrowing costs, 
damage to the economic recovery, and broader disruptions to the financial system”).  
135. The issuance of potentially illegitimate debt could reduce investor confidence in 
the federal government’s commitment to meet its obligations. A loss of investor 
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fore, is that a president’s attempt to avoid default on government obliga-
tions might cause precisely the real-world problem that it is designed to 
avoid. 
The difference, however, is in degree. A straight default on obliga-
tions, especially debt payments, ends any pretense that the government is 
a reliable financial player.136 Issuing bonds of uncertain reliability will 
almost surely increase borrowing costs, but any such increase can be no 
more than the increase that would attend an up-front default. 
Moreover, the underlying factors that could make the Presidential 
bonds less valuable are factors that would independently have even more 
catastrophic effects on the economy as a whole. If, even after failing to 
make an eleventh-hour compromise, Congress and the president still 
cannot come to an agreement to end the trilemma, then there will be 
reason to worry for the future of the nation. Even the regular budget 
process, which precedes the possible creation of any trilemmas, would be 
so broken that it would no longer permit the proper functioning of the 
government. 
Accordingly, if the president had good reason to conclude that the 
market would demand intolerably high interest rates for Presidential 
bonds, then on that basis he might appropriately rule out ignoring the 
debt ceiling as the solution to the trilemma. But in such a scenario, it 
would be a policy consideration—the sub-junk status of the prospective 
Presidential bonds—rather than a constitutional consideration per se, 
that would take the issuance of new debt off the table. Conversely, how-
ever, if the president had good reason to believe that financial markets 
would only demand a tolerable interest premium for the Presidential 
bonds, so that issuing them would make financial sense, then our analysis 
suggests that this path should be constitutionally preferred because the 
key constitutional consideration—how much legislative power the presi-
dent must usurp in order to carry out the solution—favors issuing new 
debt over canceling appropriations. 
In addition, the one aspect of issuing debt that is not purely 
mechanical is, as noted above, the determination of the maturities of the 
debt securities. If the president decides to issue bonds on his own author-
ity, he must decide (as, indeed, he must when issuing bonds under any 
circumstance) whether to issue long-term obligations, short-term obliga-
tions, or some combination of maturities. While our earlier argument 
with regard to unilateral spending cuts warned of the power of executive 
                                                                                                                 
confidence could result in much higher interest rates on the potentially illegitimate debt. 
See id. at 12 (“If creditors lost this confidence, the federal government’s interest costs 
would likely increase substantially and there would likely be broader disruptions to 
financial markets.”). 
136. Again, at least initially, the lack of confidence would not be based on any 
underlying economic reason, but solely because the political system is creating a false crisis 
and a wholly unnecessary trilemma for the President. Once the crisis takes hold, of course, 
the damage could spread to the real economy. 
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discretion, such discretion in the context of debt issuance can work to 
the advantage of the nation. If the president determines, for example, 
that the financial markets will accept only short-term Presidential bonds, 
then he can choose to issue only such bonds. If, on the other hand, 
financial leaders were to inform the president that lenders would rather 
buy long-term bonds—perhaps on the theory that the budget process will 
have been long since healed ten years hence, with ex post commitment 
of the full faith and credit of the United States government to the 
Presidential bonds (converting them into standard Treasury bonds)—
then the president can act accordingly. We need make no judgment here 
about how the president should act.  We simply note that the president, 
even when executing an extraordinary decision to issue bonds without 
congressional authorization, would retain only the type of discretion that 
he already possesses in his duties to manage the debt of the United 
States. This is far different from a president taking it upon himself to 
alter levels of spending. 
In short, while unauthorized issuance of debt would hardly be ideal, 
and would carry with it risks of financial and economic disruption, it 
would be a more rational and administrable process—to say nothing of a 
more limited expansion of presidential discretion—than enacting unau-
thorized spending cuts. For this and other reasons,137 it would thus be a 
less unconstitutional138 course than unilateral presidential spending cuts, 
because rationality and administrability are not merely practical consid-
erations; they may bear on constitutionality. Other things being equal, a 
presidential course of action in an area of congressional primacy is on 
firmer constitutional ground where the president can follow Congress’s 
priorities, rather than having to fashion his own in order to act coher-
ently. 
3. When the President Increases Taxes. — Finally, what are the practical 
issues that would arise if the president resolved the trilemma by increas-
ing taxes to levels above those authorized by Congress under the tax law? 
Taxes lie somewhere between debt and spending in terms of their 
heterogeneity. Asking a government to “borrow money” is a rather unam-
biguous request (again, other than certain technical matters, especially 
the maturity dates of the new debt). Asking it to “collect taxes” neces-
sarily implicates a broader range of questions, covering the tax base (that 
                                                                                                                 
137. Wholly apart from considerations of rationality and administrability, ignoring 
the debt ceiling would be less unconstitutional than unilateral presidential spending cuts 
because the former, but not the latter, would ensure that the government did not violate 
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to meet its legal obligation to pay its 
bills. Cf. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4. In addition, as we discussed above and elaborate 
more fully below, ignoring the debt ceiling best reflects what appear to be Congress’s 
priorities. See supra Part II.A. 
138. We elaborate more fully on what we mean by degrees of constitutionality in Part 
III, infra. 
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is, what to tax), the rates of taxation, and the likelihood of tax evasion 
and avoidance. 
Because of these unknowns, the decision to increase taxes neces-
sarily confers powers upon the president (who, throughout this analysis, 
is assumed to be acting without the authority of Congress), with signifi-
cant policy implications. For example, if the president decided to collect 
the necessary funds by increasing estate taxes, that would have quite 
different effects than if he authorized an increase in excise taxes. 
Even so, increasing taxes appears to raise somewhat fewer issues of 
complexity than cutting spending. Collecting more money from people 
than they expected to pay might cause hardship, and it might unravel 
some transactions that would otherwise take place, but the tax collectors 
would not face all of the types of questions that budget cutters would face 
in the scenarios described above. 
From a purely administrative standpoint, moreover, collecting more 
taxes is fully within the capacities of the agencies over which the presi-
dent exercises authority.139 He could, for example, simply instruct the tax 
authority to increase withholding on all regular paychecks, under the 
income tax or the Social Security and Medicare taxes. This process is 
fully automated, and the president’s authorization would be all that was 
needed to collect additional funds. Some refusals to pay might follow, 
but because the employers withholding the taxes are not paying those 
taxes, the process could be expected to be administratively simple. 
Deciding to increase the taxes that are easier to collect is, of course, 
a policy choice of its own. The burdens would not be shared equally. This 
would be one of many reasons that the president would be sure to face 
fierce political resistance to any attempt to increase taxes. The adminis-
trative simplicity, however, is a strong argument for increasing taxes, 
rather than cutting spending, in the event that the financial markets rule 
out the possibility of Presidential bonds. 
                                                                                                                 
139. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2329 
(2001) (“Congress’s delegations of power to the President logically coexist with a 
presumption that the President has ultimate control over all executive agency decisions.”). 
The Internal Revenue Service, which is responsible for collecting taxes, is a bureau of the 
Department of the Treasury—an executive department controlled by the president.  
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D. Prudential Issues Raised by the President’s Choice 
The analysis above set aside many policy issues, focusing instead on 
the practical implications of each possible solution to the trilemma. At 
least as important, however, are the prudential questions that are raised 
by different types of unauthorized presidential actions. Such considera-
tions suggest a different set of tradeoffs, based on the likely effects of a 
president’s choice, both in the immediate crisis, and in the precedent 
that it would set for the country going forward. 
The political branches of government are at their most political (in 
both good and bad senses) when taxing and spending are involved. 
While Congress has agreed over the years to delegate its authority to coin 
and regulate money,140 for example, it has never allowed technocratic 
agencies to determine the levels and types of taxes and spending that the 
government undertakes. Election campaigns are often fought over issues 
of taxes and spending, and any compromises are designed to trade off 
important priorities, benefits, and costs.141 
When Congress agrees to a spending law, it therefore is making a 
statement about the importance of various choices, both absolutely and 
relatively. If Congress as a whole determines that there should be a 
certain level of social spending versus military spending, for example, it is 
almost surely true that each member of Congress would have preferred a 
different balance. The ultimate spending bill, therefore, represents in 
raw form the political balance of power in any given year.  
Similarly, the tradeoffs involved in designing the tax laws are also 
deeply political. A senator who would prefer a pure consumption tax 
allows the income tax to continue, on the condition that certain types of 
saving are exempt from taxes. A believer in low corporate tax rates nego-
tiates a compromise in which she allows somewhat higher rates, on the 
condition that the recognition of certain corporate income can be 
deferred. The nature and complexity of the political choices is limited 
only by the imaginations of the parties to the negotiations. 
As the process of determining the budget and appropriations pro-
ceeds, putting the taxing and spending decisions together multiplies the 
ways in which the result is best viewed as a set of quid pro quos and 
                                                                                                                 
140. See Fed. Reserve Sys., Purposes, supra note 81, at 85 (“Each of the twelve 
Reserve Banks is authorized by the Federal Reserve Act to issue currency, and the 
Department of Treasury is authorized to issue coin.”).  
141. See William G. Jacoby, Public Attitudes Toward Government Spending, 38 Am. 
J. Pol. Sci. 336, 336 (1994) (noting government spending is “significant policy issue” in 
U.S. election campaigns); Susan A. MacManus, Taxing and Spending Politics: A 
Generational Perspective, 57 J. Pol. 607, 607 (1995) (“[T]axing and spending issues are 
increasingly at the forefront of most elections . . . .”); Gerald F. Seib, Taxes Emerge as 
Defining Issue for 2012 Campaign, Capital Journal, Wall St. J. (Sept. 19, 2011, 1:16 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903374004576580710594126704.html 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing taxes are important issue in every election, 
but will be particularly significant in 2012 election because of nation’s economic distress). 
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understandings that each member of Congress expects to be honored. 
These tradeoffs and balances fully satisfy no one, of course, but they are 
hammered out in the atmosphere of a representative body that is consti-
tutionally empowered to make just such difficult choices. 
The debt ceiling could be viewed as merely part of this mixture of 
tradeoffs. When Congress passed the 2011 budget in spring 2011,142 
perhaps it did so in the full knowledge that what its members were agree-
ing upon would never be enacted. If that were true, however, it would 
suggest that the debt ceiling was being used as a bait-and-switch mecha-
nism, with one side acting in bad faith, never intending to honor the 
compromises over taxing and spending to which it had agreed. 
In any event, the question posed by the trilemma is not whether the 
will of Congress might be frustrated by the president’s choice about how 
to proceed. The key issue is which choice least threatens Congress’s higher 
priorities. If Congress passes a budget that implies a level of borrowing, 
yet it also leaves in place prior legislation that purports to forbid that new 
level of borrowing, a president who ignores the debt ceiling will honor 
the most recent—and, we would argue, most important—of Congress’s 
stated priorities, allowing the absolute and relative magnitudes of taxes 
and spending mandated by Congress to be carried out. 
The worst that can happen in such a case is that Congress would 
need to undo the damage in a future budget. That is, if the president’s 
guess is incorrect, and Congress’s highest priority was to prevent the 
national debt from exceeding a certain dollar amount, then Congress 
has the power to pass budgets in future years with surpluses sufficient to 
return to the debt level that it prefers.143 The damage that might be 
wrought in the meantime, or by having to live under a more austere 
budget in future years than otherwise, is a cost of ignoring Congress’s will 
today. The costs of allowing a president to violate the balance of 
Congress’s priorities in taxing and spending, however, are much more 
difficult to undo because the departure from Congress’s choices could 
create a dramatically different status quo, thus calling into play a new set 
of political forces. If Congress does not like the choices the president 
makes in canceling spending or raising taxes, the new reality may prevent 
it from putting people in the position that Congress intended when it 
passed its budget.144 That is, while it is straightforward to say, “we hereby 
                                                                                                                 
142. See Hook, supra note 118 (describing months of congressional conflicts leading 
up to passage of 2011 budget). 
143. Indeed, as noted above, Congress can even prospectively couple a “hard” debt 
ceiling with a delegation to the president of the power to impound appropriated 
spending. See supra text accompanying notes 120–122. 
144. In an important article, Professors Eskridge and Ferejohn explained how 
judicial and administrative constructions of statutes can change the legal status quo against 
which the vector sum of political forces in Congress operates. See generally William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 Geo. L.J. 523 (1992). Our 
2012] LESSONS OF THE DEBT CEILING STANDOFF 1215 
 
decree that the national debt should be reduced back to $X trillion,” and 
then to pass legislation and retire outstanding debt to make it so, it is 
much more difficult (and, perhaps, impossible in many instances) to 
restore the status quo ante for people whose taxes were increased by the 
president, or who failed to receive particular benefits under the presi-
dent’s discretionary spending cuts. (Again, refunding tax payments, or 
honoring contractual obligations long after benefits were due, does not 
guarantee that people will be restored to the state in which Congress 
intended them to be.) Just as legislation can be sticky,145 so too can acts 
taken by the president that usurp legislative power. 
Finally, the prudential tradeoffs inherent in the trilemma can be 
framed as a question of how much power each choice confers on the 
president. Or, to put it in partisan political terms, which choice would be 
the least worrisome from the standpoint of a member of Congress who is 
not from the president’s party? While reasonable people might offer 
different answers to that question, giving the president the power with 
the least latitude—and that is most easily reversed—strikes us as the 
prudent choice, no matter which parties control the various political 
bodies. For the foregoing reasons, it seems clear that the president would 
minimize his assumption of power by issuing debt rather than rebalanc-
ing taxing and spending choices. 
E. The Hierarchy of Choices 
Our analysis, therefore, is not designed to favor one party or ideol-
ogy over another. We believe that anyone who values the separation of 
powers, and who wishes to protect Congress’s prerogatives under the 
Constitution, would be best served in the first instance by making sure 
that no president is ever faced with such a choice. If the political system 
fails, however, the president can best honor the balances inherent in the 
Constitution by ignoring the debt ceiling. 
But as we noted above, markets could react so badly to the prospect 
of Presidential bonds as to reduce the president’s trilemma to a dilemma: 
unilaterally cut spending or raise taxes. Which of these options would be 
less unconstitutional? Surprisingly, our hierarchy of choices tentatively 
suggests that the president’s second-least-bad choice would be to raise 
taxes. In addition to the administrative advantages noted above, raising 
taxes rather than cutting spending would not shortchange persons who 
are legally entitled to government funds. Thus, raising taxes, like ignor-
ing the debt ceiling, avoids a violation of Section 4 of the Fourteenth 
                                                                                                                 
point here is that a presidential decision to cancel spending or impose taxes can be 
equally or more disruptive and can preclude a congressional “fix” in much the same way. 
145. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A 
Reappraisal, 111 Yale L.J. 1665, 1667–69 (2002) (discussing possibility of “entrenching 
statutes,” which cannot be changed by subsequent legislation). 
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Amendment,146 whereas spending cuts, depending on their size and 
apportionment, could violate Section 4 in addition to the separation of 
powers. 
It is curious that during the summer of 2011 so many commentators 
and politicians considered the choice to cut spending as not merely the 
least bad choice, but actually as a constitutionally valid choice.147 We, by 
contrast, recognize that all of the president’s choices would be unconsti-
tutional and we believe that the worst choice would be for the president 
to seek to cut spending below the levels authorized by Congress. 
What explains this difference in perspective? Candidly, this Article’s 
conclusion about the relative constitutional merits of the president’s uni-
laterally cutting spending versus raising taxes is substantially less certain 
than our conclusion that ignoring the debt ceiling is less bad than either 
of the other options. After all, the tax code is filled with deductions and 
credits that serve the same economic function as spending,148 and so 
increases in taxes, even when easier to administer than cuts in spending, 
may implicate the very same sorts of policy tradeoffs. From the perspec-
tive of separation of powers, therefore, the two could be seen as equally 
unconstitutional. 
In addition, there is a palpable sense that unilateral increases in 
taxes by the president are unthinkable in a way that unilateral spending 
cuts by the president are not.149 We fully acknowledge that, as noted 
above, this sense that a president just can’t do that would certainly con-
strain the president from raising taxes as a matter of politics. Still, it is 
not clear that this political constraint is a constitutional constraint. 
To be sure, longstanding practice is an important factor in constitu-
tional interpretation, and while there are instances in U.S. history of 
presidents spending less money than Congress appropriated,150 there is 
                                                                                                                 
146. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4. 
147. See Binyamin Appelbaum, Debt Ceiling Has Some Give, Until Roof Falls In, N.Y. 
Times, May 5, 2011, at A1 (noting Republican plan to prioritize interest payments if debt 
limit is reached necessarily requires spending cuts); Carl Hulse, Boehner Outlines 
Demands on Debt Limit Fight, N.Y. Times, May 10, 2011, at A16 (reporting Speaker 
Boehner demands “trillions of dollars in federal spending cuts in exchange for 
[Republican] support of an increase in the federal debt limit”); Jim Demint, More 
Spending Is a Threat to America, Politico (Jan. 24, 2011, 4:50 AM), http://www.politico
.com/news/stories/0111/48020.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (suggesting 
government spending is greater threat to full faith and credit of United States than 
increasing debt limit).  
148. See Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government 
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 706–07 
(1970) (explaining tax expenditures are similar to direct spending because they promote 
governmental aims, and giving examples of tax expenditures found in tax laws). 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 40–44; see also MacManus, supra note 141, 
at 623 (discussing survey of different age groups showing “all age groups overwhelmingly 
prefer spending cuts to tax increases”). 
150. See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text. 
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no history of presidents raising taxes. But there is less to this point than 
meets the eye, because there is no history of presidents spending less 
money than Congress appropriated, when Congress has required that the 
appropriated sums be fully spent.151 
Thus, we will stick with our tentative conclusion that, if faced with 
the dilemma of unconstitutionally raising taxes or unconstitutionally cut-
ting spending, the president would act less unconstitutionally by raising 
taxes. We are substantially more confident in our conclusion that he 
would act still less unconstitutionally by ignoring the debt ceiling, so long 
as the bond markets cooperated sufficiently to convert the dilemma into 
a trilemma. 
By now, however, readers may be wondering exactly what we mean 
when we say that one course of action is more or less unconstitutional than 
another. Isn’t constitutionality an on/off condition, like pregnancy? We 
hope that the discussion so far shows why the answer is no. In the next 
Part, we build on the foregoing analysis to develop a more general 
account of degrees of unconstitutionality. 
III. BEYOND THE DEBT CEILING: THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF NO 
CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS 
The prior Parts of this Article conceptualized the choice President 
Obama nearly faced in the summer of 2011 as a choice among unconsti-
tutional options. We also offered views about how a president ought to 
choose among the particular unconstitutional options of unilaterally rais-
ing taxes, unilaterally cutting spending, and unilaterally issuing debt. 
Readers may disagree with our ordinal rankings. Readers may even disa-
                                                                                                                 
151. We acknowledge that the original understanding also strongly cuts against the 
president unilaterally raising taxes. The Framers were no doubt aware of the longstanding 
parliamentary condemnation of efforts by English kings to collect taxes without legislative 
authorization and disapproved on grounds that can be roughly translated into the 
American constitutional context. See Josh Chafetz, Impeachment and Assassination, 95 
Minn. L. Rev. 347, 367–83 (2010) (discussing reign of Charles I and how it was seen by 
Benjamin Franklin); Tribe, Debt Ceiling, supra note 74 (discussing King John’s promise to 
lords, in Magna Carta, that taxation would not occur without “common counsel of our 
kingdom,” as well as condemnation, in English Bill of Rights of 1689, of efforts by James II 
to tax by royal prerogative). But this fact only provides a further reason why a president’s 
efforts to raise taxes unilaterally would be unconstitutional, which we freely admit. The 
question is whether it would be more or less unconstitutional than a president’s efforts to 
cut spending unilaterally. On that point, the original understanding is at least somewhat 
ambivalent, for it also provides grounds for condemning a president’s unilateral spending 
cuts. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Clinton v. City of New York contains ample citations 
to Founding-era documents in sounding its warning of the dangers of permitting the 
president to make spending cuts on his own. 524 U.S. 417, 449–53 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). Meanwhile, if we ask what contemporary Americans would regard as the 
paradigmatic example of executive usurpation, we think they would more likely point to 
President Nixon’s behavior during the impoundment crisis (and more broadly) than to 
seventeenth-century (or earlier) English history. 
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gree with our contention that the only realistic options during the debt 
ceiling crisis were all unconstitutional. But we hope that most readers will 
agree with us that the general problem warrants further consideration. In 
this Part, we analyze the problem in general terms: How should govern-
ment officials choose among unconstitutional options? 
One might think that when faced with no constitutional options, the 
president (or some other legal actor) is freed from constitutional con-
straint, at least when the president (or other legal actor) has not himself 
created the circumstances necessitating a fateful choice. For concrete-
ness, suppose that Congress had failed to raise the debt ceiling in the 
summer of 2011 and that Congress alone bore responsibility for that fail-
ure. President Obama might then have reasoned as follows: Congress has 
put me in the untenable position of having to violate the Constitution, so Congress 
cannot now be heard to complain if I usurp one, rather than another, of its 
powers. While this sentiment is somewhat compelling,152 it is ultimately 
wrong, and dangerously so. 
The costs of constitutional violations will be borne by the people, 
not just Congress, both in a practical sense—because people will be re-
quired to forgo payments or pay higher taxes now or in the future—and 
in a constitutional sense—because structural constitutional provisions 
ultimately serve the people, not the institutions they directly protect.153 
Thus, even when Congress has wholly avoidably created a constitutional 
trilemma (or other multi-lemma) for the president, he cannot use that 
fact as a reason to, in effect, punish the people. 
Furthermore, the “all bets are off” line of reasoning has no logical 
stopping point. If the necessity of violating the Constitution in some way 
empowers the president to violate the Constitution in any way, then a 
constitutional multi-lemma gives the president potentially unlimited 
power. To stick with the debt ceiling example, he could, in violation of 
the constitutional allocation of war-making powers,154 unilaterally order 
the armed forces to invade Venezuela or Iran, sell its oil on the world 
market, and use the proceeds to make up any shortfall between appro-
priations and revenues from authorized taxing and borrowing. He could, 
in violation of Alaska’s equal suffrage in the Senate (and other constitu-
tional limits),155 sell Alaska back to Russia. And so forth. It is clear from 
                                                                                                                 
152. Below, we explain that reasoning of this sort may warrant the conclusion that 
the courts generally should treat a political actor’s choice among unconstitutional options 
as presenting a nonjusticiable political question. See infra text accompanying note 234.  
153. See Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (“States are not the sole 
intended beneficiaries of federalism. An individual has a direct interest in objecting to 
laws that upset the constitutional balance between the National Government and the 
States . . . . Fidelity to principles of federalism is not for the States alone to vindicate.”). 
154. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–18. 
155. See, e.g., id. art. IV, § 4; id. amend. XVII.  
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these and other examples that might be adduced that not all constitu-
tional violations are equivalent. 
Once one recognizes that some constitutional violations are worse 
than others, however, there arises the difficult question of developing 
metrics for comparison. We do not attempt to formulate an algorithm 
but we state some general principles. This Part elucidates three criteria to 
guide the choice among unconstitutional options: minimize the uncon-
stitutional assumption of power; minimize sub-constitutional harm; and 
preserve, to the extent possible, each party’s own ability, and the ability 
of other actors, to undo or remedy constitutional violations. 
From where do we derive these criteria? Partly they emerge from our 
discussion of the debt ceiling crisis and other examples. In addition, they 
are implicit in the one episode of American history when a president 
admitted the possibility that he might have to choose a course of action 
from solely unconstitutional options. 
The relevant discussion appears in President Abraham Lincoln’s 
address to a special session of Congress in July 1861. In late April, 
President Lincoln had ordered the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 
suspended between Washington, D.C., and Philadelphia.156 When that 
order was carried out, Chief Justice Taney declared the presidential sus-
pension unconstitutional,157 but the writ he issued was ignored. Speaking 
to Congress a little over a month later, President Lincoln argued that his 
suspension order was constitutional,158 but before coming to that point 
he claimed that even if Congress alone had the power to suspend the 
privilege of the writ, an unconstitutional presidential suspension was 
nonetheless justified as the least unconstitutional option available. He 
asked rhetorically, “are all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the 
government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?”159 
It is clear from the context that the one “law” that warranted viola-
tion in President Lincoln’s hypothetical example was a constitutional 
provision: the Suspension Clause. But Lincoln implied that failure to 
violate the Suspension Clause would be a greater violation of the 
                                                                                                                 
156. Letter from Abraham Lincoln, President, to Winfield Scott, Commanding 
General, U.S. Army (Apr. 27, 1861), in 4 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 347, 
347 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter Collected Works of Lincoln]. 
157. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (Taney, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Md. 
1861) (No. 9,487). 
158. See Abraham Lincoln, President, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 
1861) [hereinafter Lincoln, Message to Congress], in Collected Works of Lincoln, supra 
note 156, at 421, 430–31 (noting, among other things, Suspension Clause of Article I, 
Section 9 does not specify what actor may suspend the privilege of the writ when “in Cases 
of Rebellion . . . the public Safety may require it” (quoting U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2)). 
159. Id. at 430.  
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Constitution, as it would betray the Presidential Oath,160 which requires 
the president to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the 
United States.”161 
We do not claim that Lincoln was correct that his Oath required him 
to suspend the privilege of the writ in order to save the Union. There 
may well have been actions short of unilateral suspension that would 
have protected national security as effectively. Moreover, real dangers 
lurk in presidential assertions of an unlimited constitutional duty to 
preserve national security as a basis for overriding clear constitutional 
limits. Accordingly, one can think that Lincoln erroneously concluded 
that he faced a genuine conflict between constitutional imperatives. 
However, assuming arguendo that he did face such a conflict, his method 
of resolving the conflict is instructive. 
President Lincoln more or less articulated our three criteria for 
choosing among unconstitutional options. First, he contended that 
presidential suspension, even if assumed unconstitutional, would be less 
unconstitutional than the dissolution of the Union. Second, in invoking 
the possibility that “the government itself [might] go to pieces,” Lincoln 
was not merely invoking a constitutional harm but the sub-constitutional 
harms that would follow from dissolution of the Union, which he 
balanced against what he thought would be the substantially smaller 
harm to liberty from suspension.162 Third, President Lincoln presented 
his resolution of the issue for the possibility of congressional reconsidera-
tion,163 thus observing the third principle: preservation of the power of 
other actors to remedy or undo constitutional violations. 
In addition to the doubts we have raised about whether President 
Lincoln faced a genuine conflict, reasonable minds can differ over 
whether he correctly applied the three principles, just as they can differ 
over our proposed application of the same principles to the debt ceiling 
case. But we hope that the principles themselves will command broad 
assent. After explaining why the problem of having no constitutional 
options is less rare than one might think, the balance of this Part eluci-
dates the three principles for addressing that problem. 
                                                                                                                 
160. See id. (“[W]ould not the official oath be broken, if the government should be 
overthrown, when it was believed that disregarding the single law, would tend to preserve 
it?”).  
161. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 8. 
162. See Lincoln, Message to Congress, supra note 158, at 430 (contending privilege 
of writ of habeas corpus “relieves more of the guilty, than of the innocent” and would only 
be violated by presidential suspension “to a very limited extent”). 
163. See id. at 431 (“Whether there shall be any legislation upon the subject, and if 
any, what, is submitted entirely to the better judgment of Congress.”). 
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A. The Scope of the Problem 
There is virtually no legal doctrine governing the choice among un-
constitutional options. That absence partly reflects the fact that the 
Constitution’s commands are almost entirely negative, forbidding rather 
than requiring certain actions. For example, government officials may 
not deprive persons of life, liberty or property without due process, but 
they generally need not take any affirmative steps to provide persons with 
various protections and benefits.164 Accordingly, when faced with the 
temptation to act unconstitutionally, government actors can usually satis-
fy the Constitution by simply doing nothing. 
However, government actors sometimes labor under affirmative 
duties. Two such duties were at issue in the debt ceiling crisis. The Take 
Care Clause imposes one duty. The president’s duty to take care that the 
laws are faithfully executed is best understood as an affirmative duty to 
execute the law.165 Thus, although justiciability doctrines limit the ability 
of private parties to seek court orders to the Administration to carry out 
the law,166 the duty exists nonetheless. A president who refused to exe-
cute some law would, at a minimum, need to explain to the public (and 
perhaps to members of Congress seeking to impeach him) that the law is 
either unconstitutional167 or that refusal to execute the law in some set of 
circumstances was a valid exercise of prosecutorial discretion.168 Simple 
                                                                                                                 
164. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991) (“The Government has no 
affirmative duty to commit any resources to facilitating abortions . . . .” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)); DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 
189, 195 (1989) (“[N]othing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the 
State to protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private 
actors.”).  
165. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1432, 1471 (1988) (“The ‘take Care’ clause, however, is a duty, not a license. The 
clause requires the President to carry out the law as enacted by Congress.”).  
166. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568–69 (1992) (opinion of 
Scalia, J.) (“‘[S]uits challenging . . . the particular programs agencies establish to carry out 
their legal obligations [are] rarely if ever appropriate for federal-court adjudication.’” 
(quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759–60 (1984))). 
167. See Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 
Op. O.L.C. 199, 201 (1994) (“Where the President believes that an enactment [is 
unconstitutional], he has the authority to defend his office and decline to abide by 
it . . . .”). 
168. See Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115 
Yale L.J. 2280, 2293 (2006) (“[The judiciary is reluctant] to review prosecutorial decisions 
[because of] the background constitutional premise that the exercise of such discretion is 
‘a special province of the Executive.’” (quoting Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 489 (1999))). 
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nonenforcement would be, prima facie, a breach of constitutional 
duty.169 
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment indicates another affirma-
tive duty of the president. Suppose that some bonds or other government 
bills came due. Suppose further that, under the best interpretation of 
Section 4, failure to pay the bondholders and other bill submitters would 
call into question the public debt, and thus violate Section 4. That con-
clusion is a conclusion that Section 4 imposes an affirmative obligation. 
Phrased in the passive voice (“shall not be questioned”),170 the provi-
sion’s language draws no distinction between acts that would call the 
public debt into question and omissions that would do so. Indeed, one 
would expect that in the usual course Section 4 would most frequently 
apply to omissions (namely, failures to pay). 
Nor is the president the only government actor with affirmative 
obligations under the Constitution. For example, government officials 
have affirmative duties to persons in their custody, such as prisoners.171  
Or consider the situation of a trial judge faced with a request by a 
criminal defendant to restrict press access to courtroom proceedings in 
some way in order to guarantee a fair trial. Doing nothing is not in any 
meaningful sense an option. To be sure, the trial judge could order that 
the indictment be dismissed on the ground that there is no way to fully 
honor both the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and the First 
Amendment rights of the press. In a sense, that would be doing nothing. 
But we think—and as we explain below, the courts think—that this is too 
high a price to pay to avoid choosing the lesser constitutional evil. 
In light of the fact that government actors will, from time to time, 
need to choose among unconstitutional options, how should they make 
that choice? We next elaborate three salient principles. 
B. Minimize the Unconstitutional Assumption of Power 
In our discussion of the practical dimensions of the various horns of 
the trilemma in Part II, we noted how a presidential decision to ignore 
the debt ceiling would require a smaller exercise of distinctively policy 
judgment than would be required by a decision to cut spending or raise 
taxes. That factor matters for the comparative constitutional analysis 
because of the nature of the underlying violations. Any presidential 
decision to tax, borrow, or spend (or not spend) without congressional 
                                                                                                                 
169. See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(“Article II, Section 3 . . . does not permit the President to refrain from executing laws 
duly enacted by the Congress as those laws are construed by the judiciary.”). 
170. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 4.  
171. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994) (“‘[P]rison officials have a 
duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence . . . .’” (quoting Cortes-Quinones v. Jiminez-
Nettleship, 842 F.2d 556, 558 (1st Cir. 1988))); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–04 
(1976) (holding prison officials have obligation to provide medical care to prisoners).  
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authorization violates the principle of separation of powers because the 
powers to tax, to borrow, and to spend (or not spend) are all allocated to 
Congress, not the president.172 But in so allocating power, the 
Constitution also allocates to Congress the power to make the innumera-
ble policy tradeoffs and compromises that go into a budget.173 Indeed, 
one could readily say that the Constitution allocates to the most repre-
sentative branch of the federal government the powers to tax, borrow, 
and spend precisely because the exercise of these powers involves inher-
ently political choices. 
One might plausibly disagree with our conclusion that the president 
assumes more legislative policy power when he unilaterally cuts spending 
than when he unilaterally raises taxes. One could even disagree with our 
conclusion that the president assumes more legislative policy power 
when he unilaterally cuts spending or raises taxes than when he unilater-
ally issues Presidential bonds. But we hope that no one will disagree with 
our underlying view that, other things being equal, as between two ways 
of unilaterally exercising legislative power in violation of the 
Constitution, the president should choose the course in which he uncon-
stitutionally exercises less legislative power. 
In choosing whether to usurp the legislative power to borrow, tax, or 
(not) spend, the president apparently faces a choice among roughly 
commensurable constitutional violations. Each power is allocated to 
Congress, and so the president compares apples to apples in choosing 
whether the constitutional balance of power will be more or less upset by 
his unilateral exercise of one rather than another power. 
Yet the actions in question are not exactly commensurate: One 
might think that taxing is somehow more quintessentially a legislative 
power than borrowing or spending,174 in which case one might conclude 
(contrary to our own tentative conclusion in Part II) that the constitu-
                                                                                                                 
172. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1–2; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7; 2 Joseph Story, 
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §§ 903–908, 1051 (Boston, 
Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833) (discussing Congress’s powers to tax, borrow, and spend); see 
also Clinton L. Rossiter, Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in Modern 
Democracies 226–27 (1948) (discussing President Lincoln’s unauthorized advancement of 
two million dollars of unappropriated funds to three private citizens).  
173. See Stephen E. Frantzich & Claude Berube, Congress: Games and Strategies 9 
(4th ed. 2010) (discussing importance of persuasion and compromise in congressional 
coalition building); James J. Gosling, Economics, Politics, and American Public Policy 64 
(2008) (noting Congress’s choices in budgetary process “represent an amalgam of 
compromises and accommodations that have presidential initiatives as their starting 
point”).  
174. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Conservative Assault on the Constitution 77 (2010) 
(“Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to tax and spend and this always 
has been regarded as a quintessential legislative power.”); The Federalist No. 33, at 159 
(Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001) (describing 
power to tax as “the most important of the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the 
Union”).  
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tionally worst option would be for the president to unilaterally raise 
taxes. Further, depending on which unilateral course the president 
chooses, he might violate constitutional provisions beyond separation of 
powers. As we discussed in Part II, a presidential decision unilaterally cut-
ting spending would potentially violate Section 4 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as well as separation of powers. Meanwhile, a presidential 
decision to unilaterally raise taxes could be said to violate the provision 
of Article I requiring that bills raising revenue must originate in the 
House of Representatives.175 There is no agreed-upon metric for aggre-
gating and weighing these respective constitutional violations. Indeed, 
with the notable exception of President Lincoln’s all-the-laws-but-one 
speech, there does not even appear to be any awareness of the potential 
problem. 
Our analysis proceeds by considering real and imaginary examples. 
Suppose first that Congress purported to “solve” the debt ceiling impasse 
by raising the debt ceiling by an amount insufficient to cover the existing 
shortfall, but that, in violation of the Takings Clause176 and (maybe) the 
Bill of Attainder Clause,177 Congress made up the difference by including 
in the same bill a measure confiscating the holdings of a small number of 
extremely wealthy individuals named in the bill. Could the president sign 
the bill on the theory that violating the Takings Clause and (maybe) the 
Bill of Attainder Clause would be no worse than usurping legislative 
power, as he would have to do under the trilemma if he vetoed the 
legislation? Or, conversely, is it categorically worse to violate two 
constitutional provisions or doctrines—the Takings Clause and the Bill of 
Attainder Clause—than to violate just one—the separation of powers 
doctrine? Would the confiscation plan be constitutionally equivalent to 
unilateral presidential action cutting spending because each action 
involves two distinct constitutional violations? 
We would reject the notion that the key question is the number of 
constitutional provisions at stake. Perhaps if other things were equal, 
then one could say that it is worse to violate n+1 constitutional provisions 
than to violate n constitutional provisions. But more broadly, any 
measure of comparative constitutional harm should be qualitative, not 
quantitative—or at least not merely quantitative. 
Next consider an admittedly fanciful example. Suppose a criminal 
madman slips undetected into the Oval Office and, holding a loaded gun 
to the head of the president, orders him either (1) to instruct FBI agents 
to perform a warrantless search of the home of the criminal’s ex-wife and 
charge her with possession of obscenity when they find a copy of Lady 
Chatterley’s Lover; or (2) to unilaterally declare war on Iran and order a 
                                                                                                                 
175. U.S. Const. art. I, § 7, cl. 1.  
176. Id. amend. V.  
177. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
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nuclear strike against Tehran. Assuming the president is unwilling to 
take a bullet for the Constitution (as the consequence of a refusal to 
make a choice),178 we think it fairly clear that the president should 
choose option (1). Option (1) is not only less harmful than option (2), 
but also less unconstitutional, even though option (1) involves violating 
two constitutional provisions (the Fourth and First Amendments), 
whereas option (2) only involves violating one (the allocation to 
Congress of the power to declare war).179 We recognize, however, that we 
have not yet fully unpacked exactly what we mean by “less unconstitu-
tional.” For now, we are relying on what we expect will be broadly shared 
intuitions. 
Those same shared intuitions also undercut any suggestion that 
rights are trumps180 in the sense that one should always prefer violating 
some non-rights provision to violating a rights provision. Rights may be 
trumps in the sense that they prevail against most utilitarian goals,181 but 
they are not trumps in the sense that they always prevail against other 
(non-rights) constitutional provisions. Indeed, constitutional doctrine 
allows that rights can generally be overridden by laws that are narrowly 
tailored to serve compelling interests,182 whereas most non-rights provi-
sions do not appear to permit such overrides. For example, the legislative 
veto is not permitted even if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
                                                                                                                 
178. In the next section, we shall have more to say about whether the president or 
other government official must always choose a constitutional option, if available, even if 
the only constitutional options are catastrophic. For now, readers who think that the 
president should simply refuse to choose should imagine a variant on the hypothetical 
example in which the madman informs the president that if the president refuses to 
choose either option, the madman—who is, among his other talents, an excellent mimic—
will impersonate the president and order both the violation of the rights of the madman’s 
ex-wife and the nuclear strike on Tehran. Thus, in this modified example, failure to 
choose itself leads to unconstitutional actions. 
179. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
180. See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, at xi–xv, 367 (1977) (describing 
political rights as “trumps” that exist when “a collective goal is not a sufficient justification 
for denying them what they wish, as individuals, to have or to do, or not a sufficient 
justification for imposing some loss or injury upon them”). 
181. See Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 370 (1985) (developing equality-
based theory in which certain “rights should be accepted as trumps over utility, if utility is 
accepted . . . as the proper background justification”).  
182. For this reason, Professor Schauer has aptly stated that rights are better 
understood as shields rather than trumps. See Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the 
Structure of Rights, 27 Ga. L. Rev. 415, 429–30 (1993) (arguing rights “protect against 
certain low justification . . . efforts to restrict the activities that the rights are rights to, but 
do not protect against high justification . . . efforts to restrict those activities”).  
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interest,183 whereas a law that abridges freedom of speech or uses a sus-
pect classification would be valid if it had that characteristic.184 
That difference suggests that perhaps the opposite presumption 
should apply. In other words, perhaps nonderogable constitutional pro-
visions (like the Article I, Section 7 requirements at issue in the line-item 
veto case185) should generally prevail over derogable ones (like the rights 
to free speech and to equal protection). We think that there may be a 
limited sense in which such a presumption in fact makes sense: Comply-
ing with separation of powers, federalism, or other non-derogable consti-
tutional limits could, in principle, be the sort of compelling interest that 
justifies use of a race-based classification or a content-based regulation of 
speech.186 
But one must be careful not to run too far with this line of analysis. 
Although saving the president’s life certainly counts as a compelling 
interest, we do not think it would be accurate to say that it is therefore 
constitutionally permissible for the president to order the FBI to charge 
the gun-wielding madman’s ex-wife with obscenity for possessing non-
obscene materials. First Amendment doctrine is nonderogable on this 
particular: It does not utilize the compelling interest test to determine 
what qualifies as obscenity.187 Likewise, neither is doctrine under the 
Fourth Amendment, the other rights provision in this hypothetical case, 
exactly derogable. To be sure, there are exceptions to the warrant 
requirement, and some of them—such as the exigent circumstances 
exception188—are based on compelling interests, but the doctrine does 
not directly ask in particular cases whether to sacrifice the right for the 
sake of a compelling interest.189 So the possibility of using existing doc-
trine under a constitutional right to accommodate a structural constitu-
tional provision will not always be available. 
                                                                                                                 
183. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (holding congressional veto 
unconstitutional).  
184. See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725–26 (2000) (upholding as 
constitutional Colorado criminal statute prohibiting individuals from knowingly 
approaching within eight feet of another person near health care facilities without that 
person's consent, because it served significant government interests and was narrowly 
tailored toward those interests). 
185. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).  
186. Cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2677, 2681 (2009) (stating compliance 
with Title VII could be compelling interest justifying presumptively impermissible race-
conscious public employment measures).  
187. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1973) (discussing 
standard for identifying obscenity); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) 
(same). 
188. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857–58 (2011) (discussing exigent 
circumstances exception to general requirement that warrant be obtained prior to 
search). 
189. Id. at 1858–60.  
2012] LESSONS OF THE DEBT CEILING STANDOFF 1227 
 
Moreover, even when a right can be overridden by a compelling 
interest, the doctrine assumes that overriding the right is necessary to 
achieve that compelling interest in some non-fortuitous way.190 Yet the 
gun to the head of the president bears the wrong sort of causal relation-
ship to any benefit that would derive from charging the madman’s ex-
wife with obscenity for such a charge to qualify as narrowly tailored to 
advancing a compelling interest. We think that in our hypothetical 
example, it is more straightforward and more accurate to say that the 
madman creates a choice for the president between unconstitutional 
options. To characterize one option as valid by virtue of the fact that it 
enables the president to avoid the other option is to omit the key step in 
the process: deciding which option is worse. We shall return to this char-
acterization issue in Part III.C below. 
For now, we want to note the seemingly irreducible mushiness of any 
plausible test for degrees of unconstitutionality. It is easier to state what 
the test should not be than what it should be. As noted above, the test 
should not simply count the number of constitutional violations. Nor do 
we think that there can be any all-purpose hierarchy of constitutional 
provisions. To use an example to which we shall return below, it may be 
tempting to say that the First Amendment is more important than the 
Sixth Amendment or vice-versa, but nothing in the constitutional text or 
our history provides a basis for either judgment.191 One can imagine cir-
cumstances in which the values underlying one provision prevail over 
those underlying the other, as well as vice-versa. 
To make that last point concrete, suppose that the gun-wielding 
madman has different priorities. Suppose that he offers the president the 
following choice: (1) send the FBI to the home of a potential whistle-
blower with instructions to seize and destroy documents exposing high-
level government corruption;192 or (2) approve, and then act upon, a 
Justice Department legal memorandum asserting that American support 
for Libyan rebels in their resistance against the Gadhafi regime can con-
tinue without notification to Congress under the War Powers Act.193 Even 
                                                                                                                 
190. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668 (2011) (overturning 
Vermont law prohibiting pharmacies and other entities from selling prescriber-identifying 
information without prescriber’s consent on grounds that law was not narrowly tailored to 
compelling state interests in improved public health and reduced healthcare costs).  
191. See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) (“The authors of the Bill 
of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as between First Amendment and Sixth 
Amendment rights, ranking one as superior to the other.”). 
192. This scenario is not very different from what President Nixon ordered with 
respect to Daniel Ellsberg, except of course that no one was holding a gun to Nixon’s 
head at the time. See Egil Krogh, The Break-In That History Forgot, N.Y. Times, June 30, 
2007, at A17. 
193. Auth. To Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. (Apr. 1, 2011) (release at 
1), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) (“We concluded that the President had the constitutional 
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assuming that the president believes that option (2) would usurp the war-
declaring power of Congress, he could nonetheless fairly conclude that 
option (2) is less unconstitutional than option (1) because the abuse of 
power entailed by (1) makes the violations of the Fourth and First 
Amendments worse in this case. Comparing this conclusion with the 
conclusion we reached with respect to the first set of choices discussed 
above in the original gun-wielding madman scenario, we see that the 
question whether one unconstitutional option is more or less unconstitu-
tional than another can yield different answers in different circum-
stances, even when the exact same constitutional provisions are in play.194  
Does that mean that the entire enterprise of comparing unconstitu-
tional courses of action is utterly mysterious? Not necessarily. To say that 
one cannot devise an all-purpose formula for weighing constitutional 
harms against one another is not to say that the enterprise is hopelessly 
subjective. We think that the sorts of factors that might be invoked in 
particular circumstances will often garner consensus. Indeed, we are 
familiar with courts and political actors making the relevant sorts of 
judgments, even if we are unaccustomed to thinking of them in the terms 
described in this Article. 
Consider the choice courts must make in deciding whether to adopt 
a proposed narrowing construction of a statute in order to avoid a diffi-
cult constitutional question. On the one hand, courts try to construe 
statutes so that they are constitutional, because invalidating a statute is a 
serious affront to the democratic will as expressed through the legisla-
ture.195 On the other hand, courts will not wholly rewrite statutes in order 
to avoid difficult constitutional questions, because such rewriting is a 
different sort of affront to the democratic will, insofar as it usurps the 
legislative function.196 Which affront is worse? The cases do not give a 
                                                                                                                 
authority to direct the use of force in Libya . . . . We also advised that prior congressional 
approval was not constitutionally required to use military force in the limited operations 
under consideration.”). This Article assumes for purposes of this hypothetical example 
that the gun-wielding madman threatens the president before the Gadhafi regime has 
been displaced.  
194. Our examples are purely illustrative. Thus, we invite readers who reach other 
conclusions with respect to our scenarios to imagine their own scenarios in which the 
answer to the question whether one or another constitutional provision prevails in a 
conflict changes based on the context. 
195. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932) (“When the validity of an act 
of the Congress is . . . in question . . . even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it 
is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the 
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”). 
196. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1591–92 (2010) (refusing to 
rewrite statute “for doing so would constitute a ‘serious invasion of the legislative domain,’ 
and sharply diminish Congress’ ‘incentive to draft a narrowly tailored law in the first 
place.’” (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 
479 n.26 (1995); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 121 (1990))); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 
844, 884–85 (1997) (“This Court ‘will not rewrite a . . . law to conform it to constitutional 
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categorical answer, instead applying context-specific judgment to allow 
creative interpretation but not rewriting. While there is no sharp bound-
ary line between those activities, there can be consensus about a great 
many cases that fall on one or the other side of the boundary. 
We think the same should be true about choices among unconstitu-
tional options. In our discussion of the debt-ceiling crisis in Part II, we 
gave context-specific reasons why a presidential decision simply to ignore 
the debt ceiling would require the exercise of substantially less legislative-
style policy judgment than the decision of what programs to cut and by 
how much or the decision of what taxes to raise and by how much. That 
judgment reasonably closely parallels the sort of judgment courts must 
make in deciding whether a statute can fairly bear a proposed narrowing 
construction. Indeed, if anything, the argument that ignoring the debt 
ceiling usurps less legislative power than either cutting spending or rais-
ing taxes strikes us as more decisive than common arguments for adopt-
ing or rejecting a narrowing construction of a statute challenged as 
unconstitutional. More broadly, here, as elsewhere, an admittedly mushy 
multifactor test can still yield clear answers in cases far from the margins. 
One may also encounter mushiness at the threshold. Many constitu-
tional clauses and tests have fuzzy borders, and so, at least prior to a 
definitive resolution of the issue, it will not always be clear whether some 
proposed course of action would be unconstitutional. Faced with a 
choice between a merely arguably unconstitutional option and a clearly 
unconstitutional option, the possibility that the former course might turn 
out to be constitutional gives the president (or other actor) a powerful 
reason for choosing it over the clearly unconstitutional course. For sim-
plicity, our examples assume a choice among options that are all clearly 
unconstitutional, but one could apply the same analysis if one or more 
options is merely arguably unconstitutional, placing an appropriate-sized 
thumb on the scale in favor of the option that might turn out to be con-
stitutional. For the same reasons we have not attempted to reduce the 
comparison between clearly unconstitutional options to an algorithm, we 
make no such attempt where one or more options is only arguably un-
constitutional. 
C. Minimize Sub-Constitutional Harm 
Another lesson that emerges from the debt ceiling crisis is that 
decisionmakers ought to try to minimize sub-constitutional harm as well 
as constitutional harm. Here, “sub-constitutional” harm refers to real 
harm—economic hardship or even lost lives—but not necessarily harm 
that amounts to a constitutional violation. The difference between the 
two madman scenarios sheds light on what we mean. In both instances, 
option (2) involved the unconstitutional usurpation by the president of 
                                                                                                                 
requirements.’” (omission in original) (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 
383, 397 (1988))).  
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the power of Congress to commit the nation to war. But part of what 
made option (2) worse in the first scenario than in the second scenario 
was a judgment about consequences: It would be worse to use nuclear 
weapons against Iran than to provide air support for Libyan rebels 
because the likely consequences of using nuclear weapons against Iran—
the deaths of millions of Iranian civilians and the possibility of nuclear 
retaliation against the United States or its allies—would be worse than 
the consequences of supporting Libyan rebels—at best displacing a dicta-
tor with democracy and at worst a mostly contained civil war. 
But in saying that differences between the consequences of uncon-
stitutional options matter, we do not mean that consequences are all that 
matters. The president’s decision to ignore the debt ceiling, we have 
emphasized, would usurp less legislative power—and would thus be less 
unconstitutional—than a president’s decision to decide which spending 
programs to cut and by how much or which taxes to raise and by how 
much. Ignoring the debt ceiling would continue to be less unconstitu-
tional than either of the other unilateral presidential actions even if it 
appeared that, on balance, one of these other options would lead to 
somewhat better consequences. Perhaps the damage to the economy 
from the government having to pay higher rates of interest on 
Presidential bonds could be expected to be greater than the damage to 
the economy from the expected loss of confidence that would arise from 
unilateral presidential action cutting spending or raising taxes. Even so, 
we think that ignoring the debt ceiling would be the less unconstitutional 
option—unless the differences in projected consequences were reckoned 
in orders of magnitude. Put differently, taking the Constitution seri-
ously—and rejecting the “all bets are off” approach—means giving prior-
ity to minimizing constitutional harm, while treating as secondary the 
principle that sub-constitutional harm ought to be minimized. 
To be sure, giving priority to the avoidance of constitutional harm 
does not mean giving it absolute priority. If the consequences of following 
what would otherwise be the least unconstitutional of several unconstitu-
tional paths would be truly catastrophic, then we think that government 
officials would be justified in choosing a somewhat more unconstitu-
tional option that did not lead to catastrophe. With this caveat, our view 
is analogous to what moral philosophers call threshold deontology: One 
treats certain rules as impervious to arguments for being overridden by 
consequentialist considerations, unless the expected adverse conse-
quences rise above a threshold of moral catastrophe.197 For example, a 
                                                                                                                 
197. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 
893, 894 (2000) [hereinafter Alexander, Deontology] (“There are some acts that are 
morally wrong despite producing a net positive balance of consequences; but if the 
positive balance of consequences becomes sufficiently great . . . then one is morally 
permitted, and perhaps required, to engage in those acts that are otherwise morally 
prohibited.”); Michael S. Moore, Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 Isr. L. Rev. 280, 327–
32 (1989) (articulating theory and structure of threshold deontology). In drawing an 
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threshold deontologist might say that torture is morally impermissible to 
save a life or even ten lives but that it is permissible to save a million 
lives.198 Likewise here, a president should not choose to cut spending or 
raise taxes rather than ignore the debt ceiling in order to save a few 
million dollars in GDP, but he could make that choice to avert a substan-
tial chance of a worldwide depression. 
The principle of catastrophe avoidance should also apply even in 
circumstances in which the president or some other political actor has 
available at least one technically constitutional option. For parallelism we 
shall call our view of this question threshold constitutionality. Just as thresh-
old deontologists are deontologists below a threshold of catastrophic 
harm, threshold constitutionalists favor compliance with the Constitution 
below a threshold of catastrophic harm.  
We can illustrate threshold constitutionality by reference to 
Professor Balkin’s “jumbo coins” proposal. Recall that Balkin argued 
that, even if Congress had failed to raise the debt ceiling, the President 
could have avoided acting unconstitutionally if he had instructed the 
Treasury Department to mint two one-trillion-dollar platinum coins to be 
deposited in the government account with the Federal Reserve, thereby 
creating an additional two-trillion dollars for the government to spend 
on its obligations.199 
We note two objections to the jumbo coins proposal. First, the very 
act of minting trillion-dollar coins looks so cartoonish and desperate that 
it could undermine faith in the government’s ability to repay its obliga-
tions, and for that reason it might be understood as a violation of Section 
4 of the Fourteenth Amendment.200 A public that observes the federal 
government resorting to exotic gimmicks like minting trillion-dollar 
coins has reason to worry that public debt may go unpaid. Second, even 
if one takes a narrower view of Section 4—so that nothing short of actual 
default on obligations counts as a violation—the jumbo coins proposal 
would likely spook the markets, leading lenders to demand a very high 
rate of interest. 
But is that second factor a legitimate consideration absent constitu-
tional necessity? Suppose that the jumbo coins would not actually violate 
                                                                                                                 
analogy to threshold deontology, this Article expresses no position on whether threshold 
deontology, straight utilitarianism, straight deontology, or some other moral view (such as 
virtue ethics) is generally correct. 
198. Compare Alexander, Deontology, supra note 197, at 898–901 (“[T]he most 
plausible account of a deontological threshold would consider both the number of 
persons at which the interests at stake justify overriding negative duties . . . and the 
number of persons at which the interests at stake justify imposing affirmative duties . . . .”), 
with Moore, supra note 197, at 314–15 (“The moral answer . . . must be . . . [y]ou cannot 
torture or kill the innocent, even to achieve what are admittedly good 
consequences . . . .”).  
199. Balkin, Ways to Bypass, supra note 22. 
200. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment or any other constitutional 
provision. Even if minting the jumbo coins would have terrible conse-
quences, would the president nonetheless be obligated to prefer the 
jumbo coin option to one of the unconstitutional options (such as ignor-
ing the debt ceiling, cutting spending, or raising taxes)? Is there some 
requirement that a president (or other government official) must 
exhaust his constitutional options, no matter how disastrous, before he 
may even consider unconstitutional options? More generally, is threshold 
constitutionality justified? We think it is, although we also think that most 
of our analysis should be relevant to those who disagree. 
Disagreement with threshold constitutionality might lead to an abso-
lutist position. No matter how high the cost of compliance, the absolutist 
says that government officials simply may not violate the Constitution if 
they have any constitutional options. In this view, a nondefeasible consti-
tutional provision or doctrine—like the separation of powers—is just 
that: completely nondefeasible.201  
For the absolutist, choices among truly unconstitutional options will 
rarely arise, because any constitutional option—no matter how out-
landish or tragic—will have to be given priority.202 Under this view, the 
president must sacrifice his life to the gun-wielding madman rather than 
choose one of the two unconstitutional options; he must also choose the 
jumbo coins option (or some equally outlandish but constitutionally valid 
scheme) if he concludes that it is constitutional, even if doing so would 
bring financial ruin that could have been avoided by one of the other 
unconstitutional options. 
We think that the absolutist position for rejecting threshold consti-
tutionality is unjustified for the same sorts of reasons that have been 
advanced in favor of threshold deontology and other pluralist moral 
views.203 Where a deontological purist would avoid telling a lie even at the 
cost of ending the world, we would not. Averting catastrophe warrants 
violating the Constitution. 
That is not to deny that there is something to be said for the absolut-
ist view. One might worry that if constitutional provisions are not deemed 
                                                                                                                 
201. See Craig R. Ducat, Constitutional Interpretation 76–80 (9th ed. 2009) 
(discussing constitutional absolutism and the roles rules and principles play in 
determining constitutionality of laws). 
202. Just a few years before his “all the laws but one” speech, Abraham Lincoln 
appeared to endorse absolutism, albeit in a context that did not involve a threat to the 
Union. See Abraham Lincoln, Address at Cooper Institute, New York City (Feb. 27, 1860), 
in 3 Collected Works of Lincoln, supra note 156, at 522, 531 (“No one who has sworn to 
support the Constitution, can conscientiously vote for what he understands to be an 
unconstitutional measure, however expedient he may think it . . . .”). 
203. For a useful exposition of moral pluralism within the “virtue ethics” tradition 
traceable to Aristotle, see Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, An Introduction 
to Property Theory 97–101 (2012) (exploring how moral pluralist theories respond to 
problem of value incommensurability). 
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inviolable, government officials will attach too little weight to them. The 
absolutist stance is suboptimal, in this approach, but less suboptimal than 
any approach that rejects absolute prohibitions. To continue the torture 
analogy, if the law purports to permit torture but only in the ticking-
bomb scenario, one might worry that the government will start hearing 
bombs ticking everywhere.204 An absolute rule deliberately overshoots the 
mark to avoid the worse sin of undershooting the mark.205 
Notwithstanding the foregoing logic, one might conclude—as we do 
in the present context—that there are both principled and pragmatic 
problems with a deliberately overinclusive absolute prohibition. If one 
thinks that catastrophes ought to be averted, then, as a matter of princi-
ple, there is something dishonest about pretending that one takes an 
absolutist stance. Moreover, as a practical matter, it is hardly clear that 
the absolutist prohibition does not lead to overdeterrence. By hypothesis, 
threshold constitutionality only permits resort to unconstitutional action 
to avert a catastrophe, and so adopting the absolutist position risks bring-
ing about catastrophes. At a minimum, before adopting the absolutist 
position, one ought to consider the alternatives. 
One alternative would be a version of threshold constitutionality that 
incorporates catastrophe avoidance into considerations of constitutional-
ity. In this approach, catastrophe avoidance operates within constitutional 
law to treat an otherwise unconstitutional course of action as constitu-
tional so long as it is the least unconstitutional of the possible courses of 
action that avoid catastrophic harm.206 In the context of the debt ceiling 
crisis one might say something like this: We all thought that the separation 
of powers was nondefeasible, but we have now encountered a case that 
leads us to conclude otherwise. Thus, the rule that says that the president 
may not borrow money (or tax or cut spending) without congressional 
authorization should be reformulated to say that the president may not 
borrow money (or tax or cut spending) without congressional authoriza-
tion, unless doing so is necessary to avert a catastrophe. Call this the 
conflict suppression version of threshold constitutionality: In this approach, 
the Constitution accommodates the need to avoid catastrophes by 
                                                                                                                 
204. Worse yet, the government may deliberately aggravate situations in order to 
justify the use of torture. See Alexander, Deontology, supra note 197, at 902–04 
(describing possibility of intentionally increasing danger in order to reach deontological 
threshold).  
205. In the torture context, Oren Gross has argued that an absolute prohibition is 
optimal because it will lead to just the right amount of torture—almost none. Oren Gross, 
Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 
Minn. L. Rev. 1481, 1486–87, 1501–11 (2004). 
206. For similar approaches and critiques, see Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: 
The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency 157–58 (2006) (noting “law of 
necessity” should be “understood not as law but as the trumping of law by necessity”); 
Benjamin A. Kleinerman, 9/11, the Liberty/Security Balance, and the Separation of 
Powers, Crim. Just. Ethics, Winter/Spring 2007, at 59, 62 (reviewing Posner, supra).  
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authorizing what might otherwise be constitutional violations. 207 Slogans 
like “the Constitution is not a suicide pact” reflect the conflict suppres-
sion sentiment.208 
Presidents (and other elected officials) should find conflict suppres-
sion attractive because it enables them to deny that they are ever deliber-
ately taking actions that violate the Constitution. And indeed, conflict 
suppression has deep roots in our constitutional culture—so deep that 
courts and political actors virtually never even acknowledge that constitu-
tional duties may conflict. 
Consider a case that might have been a counterexample. Nebraska 
Press Ass’n v. Stuart209 involved at least the potential for a conflict between 
the First Amendment right of the press to report fully on a criminal trial 
and the Sixth Amendment right of the defendant to a fair trial untainted 
by pretrial publicity. Speaking for the Court in that case, Chief Justice 
Burger began by appearing to recognize a textual conflict. He wrote, 
“The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as 
between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as 
superior to the other.”210 He then disavowed any judicial power to 
“assign[] to one [right] priority over the other.”211 And yet, the Court 
resolved the case. 
How? By construing the outer bounds of the First and Sixth 
Amendments so that neither infringed the other. The Court held that 
gag orders may be used to override the First Amendment right to free-
dom of speech and of the press where doing so is essential to ensuring a 
fair trial212—thus favoring the Sixth Amendment over the First 
Amendment if push comes to shove—but the Court also held that in the 
particular case there had not been a sufficient showing that muzzling the 
press was necessary to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial.213 
                                                                                                                 
207. See, e.g., Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (“There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a 
little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”). 
208. Courts and commentators frequently voice this sentiment in the national 
security context. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963) 
(“[W]hile the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide 
pact.”); Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor: Why the Constitution Is a 
“Suicide Pact”, 20 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 287, 289 (2011) (discussing self-defeating 
characteristics of “true constitution”); see also David Corn, The “Suicide Pact” Mystery: 
Who Coined the Phrase? Justice Goldberg or Justice Jackson?, Slate (Jan. 4, 2002, 11:04 
AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2002/01/the_suicide_
pact_mystery.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (attributing coining of phrase to 
Justice Jackson). 
209. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). 
210. Id. at 561. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. at 562, 570.  
213. Id. at 567–69.  
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Although we agree with the substantive result of Nebraska Press Ass’n, 
we regard the Court’s claim to have avoided prioritizing rights as highly 
formalistic. The Court said, in substance if not in form, that the fair trial 
right is more important than the free press right, at least in a case of 
unavoidable conflict. But the Court somehow managed to persuade itself 
that conflict was avoidable.214 
What were the alternatives? An absolutist of the sort who would insist 
on the Treasury minting jumbo coins at the cost of crashing the global 
economy might say that the conflict in Nebraska Press Ass’n was avoidable. 
The defendant in that case was accused of murdering six people, but the 
Constitution does not require that every murderer be punished. If it were 
impossible for the defendant to receive a fair trial while at the same time 
honoring the freedom of the press, an absolutist would say that the con-
stitutionally required solution is to simply dismiss the indictment. 
The dismissal solution might take as its model the exclusionary rule 
in criminal procedure, which bars the admission of evidence obtained in 
violation of the Fourth or Fifth Amendment.215 If there is insufficient 
other evidence for a jury to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then the exclusionary rule effectively requires dismissal of an 
indictment.216 If that rule obtains for the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 
the absolutist might ask, why not for the First and Sixth Amendments? 
The comparison is suggestive but, we think, ultimately unpersuasive, 
as the Supreme Court’s own exclusionary rule jurisprudence indicates. In 
the post-Warren Court era, the case law has substantially whittled away at 
the exclusionary rule, recognizing numerous exceptions where the 
                                                                                                                 
214. Id. at 570. A federal appeals court once announced that the Fifth Amendment 
right to due process would conflict with, and should prevail over, the Seventh Amendment 
right to a civil jury trial if a case were too complex and technical for laypersons to resolve 
as jurors. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1084–86 (3d Cir. 
1980). That court cited Nebraska Press Ass’n for the proposition that when two 
constitutional requirements conflict, the court should balance the constitutionally 
protected interests to produce an accommodation. Id. at 1084. However, other appeals 
courts have rejected the notion that the jury trial right must yield because of complexity. 
See, e.g., SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1128–30 (Fed. Cir. 
1985) (“Elbowing to one side the Seventh Amendment, and the compelling social and 
democratic (much less constitutional) bases for its existence, would be at best an unseemly 
judicial exercise.”); In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 432 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding 
“there is no complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial in civil 
cases”). 
215. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306–07 (1985) (explaining interplay 
between Fifth Amendment, Miranda warnings, and remedy of exclusion for Miranda 
violations); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649–50 (1961) (holding evidence obtained in 
violation of Fourth Amendment may not be used in state criminal prosecutions). 
216. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 n.6 (1984) (discussing studies on 
effect of exclusionary rule on disposition of felony arrests). 
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Justices have found that application of the rule is not cost-justified.217 We 
think that these exceptions show that the exclusionary rule has not been 
understood in absolutist terms. Although early cases invoking a judicial 
integrity rationale for the exclusionary rule could be understood in abso-
lutist terms, the modern doctrine—which rationalizes the exclusionary 
rule as a deterrent to illegal police investigation218—shows the Court 
carefully calculating costs and benefits. Put simply, we do not have a 
criminal procedure doctrine that instructs courts to exclude unlawfully 
obtained evidence even when the results would be catastrophic. We have 
more nearly the opposite: a set of doctrines that seek to limit the damage 
from strict insistence on the observance of constitutional rights. 
Indeed, even those jurists who have resisted the erosion of the exclu-
sionary rule need not be understood as constitutional absolutists. Rather, 
it may make more sense to understand their view as one that simply 
strikes a different balance from the balance that their tougher-on-crime 
colleagues strike.219 For the would-be strict enforcers of the exclusionary 
rule, the long-term damage that comes from admitting unlawfully 
obtained evidence may seem greater than the harm that comes from 
occasionally permitting a guilty defendant to go free.220 
If a weighing of costs and benefits underlies the Justices’ avoidance 
of absolutism by commonly rejecting the application of the exclusionary 
rule as a remedy for acknowledged constitutional violations, no such 
open weighing is visible in their efforts to deal with circumstances in 
which two rights conflict. The Supreme Court’s discussion of the options 
                                                                                                                 
217. See, e.g., Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal 
Borrowing and Convergence, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 670, 691–94 (2011) (discussing 
development of cost-benefit analysis for exclusionary rule and cases in which Supreme 
Court has found application of rule not cost-justified); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp 
v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in 
Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1365, 1399–1404 (1983) (arguing against 
“good faith” exception to exclusionary rule within deterrence framework).  
218. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591–92 (2006) (noting modern 
exclusionary rule applies narrowly, only to cases with deterrence value); Peter Arenella, 
Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' 
Competing Ideologies, 72 Geo. L.J. 185, 192–93, 236–38 (1983) (“The Court has focused 
primarily on whether the future deterrent benefits secured by applying the exclusionary 
rule outweigh its present tangible costs to reliable guilt-determination.”); Thomas Y. 
Davies, The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away: The Century of 
Fourth Amendment “Search and Seizure” Doctrine, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 933, 
990–91, 997–1000, 1006–10 (2010) (tracing Supreme Court’s embrace and affirmance of 
deterrence rationale).  
219. Cf. Stewart, supra note 217, at 1404 (“I have suggested that the exclusionary rule 
is a constitutionally mandated remedy, necessary to enforce the fourth and fourteenth 
amendments, and that proposals to modify the rule must preserve an effective remedy.”). 
220. See, e.g., John P. Gross, Dangerous Criminals, the Search for the Truth and 
Effective Law Enforcement: How the Supreme Court Overestimates the Social Costs of the 
Exclusionary Rule, 51 Santa Clara L. Rev. 545, 570–71 (2011) (arguing Supreme Court 
overestimates costs of exclusionary rule, including danger from freeing guilty defendants). 
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on offer in Nebraska Press Ass’n221 was typical for American jurisprudence 
in its failure to recognize interclausal conflict, and in that respect, the 
United States is an outlier. In most other constitutional democracies, a 
court (or other constitutional interpreter) would view a conflict between 
two rights (or any two constitutional provisions) as calling for adjudica-
tion.222 A court (or other actor) would ask which right should prevail in 
the particular circumstances, by giving priority to one or the other right, 
by balancing the competing interests at stake, or by some other method 
that openly acknowledges the conflict. The following figure illustrates the 
difference between conflict suppression of the Nebraska Press Ass’n sort 
and European- or Canadian-style conflict resolution.  
In the conflict-suppression approach, the prevailing right (in 
Nebraska Press Ass’n, the Sixth Amendment fair trial right) eats into area 
that the other right (the First Amendment free press right) would other-
wise occupy. By contrast, in the conflict-acknowledgment approach, the 
constitutional decisionmaker recognizes that the two rights overlap (as 
represented by the shaded area) but then decides that one rather than 
the other right prevails in that area of overlap. 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the religion clauses of the 
First Amendment also illustrates American constitutional law’s prefer-
                                                                                                                 
221. See supra notes 209–214 and accompanying text. 
222. See Jamal Greene, The Rule of Law as a Law of Standards, 99 Geo. L.J. 1289, 
1291 (2011) (“[M]any of the world's most respected constitutional courts, including the 
courts of Canada, Germany, Israel, India, and South Africa, in addition to the European 
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, incorporate balancing into 
forms of proportionality analysis.”). For a careful exposition of the stages of balancing as 
employed in modern rights jurisprudence by one of the world’s most important jurists of 
the last quarter century, see generally Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional 
Rights and Their Limitations (2012).  
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ence for conflict suppression over conflict acknowledgment. The courts 
could say that when a person of faith seeks funding for religious activity or 
an exemption from a generally applicable law, her claim presents a 
conflict between free exercise and establishment: On the one hand, 
denial of the exemption or funding will infringe her religion; on the 
other hand, granting the exemption or funding may show favoritism 
towards religion in general or her particular religion. Under such a 
formulation, courts would be required to resolve the conflict between the 
free exercise interests and the establishment interests. But in such cases, 
the Supreme Court has gone out of its way to avoid construing the rele-
vant provisions as overlapping. Indeed, the cases recognize a kind of no 
man’s land of legislative freedom between the religion Clauses—
permitting “‘room for play in the joints’ between” free exercise and 
establishment.223 
To be sure, the results of conflict acknowledgment and conflict 
suppression may often be the same. Even the processes of reaching those 
results may be similar. However, the conflict acknowledgment approach 
has the comparative virtue of transparency: Courts (and other actors) 
openly admit both that there is a conflict between the constitutional 
provisions and that they are favoring one rather than the other 
approach. 
We do not mean to suggest that conflict acknowledgment is a 
perfect model for the choice we seek to understand in this Article, 
because we are interested in how to decide among unconstitutional 
options. Courts that acknowledge interclausal conflict typically say that 
after the balancing is completed, the course of action that vindicates the 
winning right (or other provision) is constitutionally permissible (or, in the 
case of a multinational human rights treaty such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights, permitted by the treaty).224 Nonetheless, 
conflict acknowledgment is still a better model for the choice among 
unconstitutional options than is conflict suppression because the former 
makes the element of choice apparent. 
Conflict-acknowledging approaches illustrate what Michael Walzer 
has termed the problem of “dirty hands.”225 The core idea is that political 
actors and others sometimes face “tragic choices” in which any choice 
they make (including the choice to do nothing) will be a choice to do 
evil. (The William Styron novel Sophie’s Choice—in which Nazis force a 
woman to choose which of her two children to sacrifice in order that the 
                                                                                                                 
223. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718 (2004) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 
U.S. 664, 669 (1970)). 
224. See, e.g., I.A. v. Turkey, 2005-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 249, 258 (holding Turkish court 
that fined author of book offensive to Islam did not violate European Convention on 
Human Rights due to “pressing social need”). 
225. Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, in War and Moral 
Responsibility 62 (Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1974). 
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other may be spared—presents a dramatic example in the personal 
realm.226) They have reason to choose the least bad option but doing so 
remains wrongful.227 In the legal academic literature, Oren Gross has 
built on the insights of Walzer and others to develop a set of principles 
for the legal system to evaluate extra-constitutional decisionmaking.228 
We take no position here on the exact approaches proposed by 
Walzer, Gross, or anyone else. Our point in invoking their work is much 
more basic: Whether we like it or not, life sometimes presents tragic 
choices in which there are no good options, and likewise with the law. 
Faced with a constitutional tragic choice, insistence on compliance with 
constitutional rules will be futile (if there are truly no permissible 
options), catastrophic (if there are technically permissible options that 
will lead to a catastrophe but one insists on absolute adherence to such 
rules anyway), or question-begging (if one uses a conflict suppression 
strategy). 
Summarizing the principles that have emerged in this section, we 
would emphasize three points: (1) after giving priority to minimizing 
constitutional harm, legal actors finding themselves with no constitu-
tional options should attempt to minimize sub-constitutional harm; but 
(2) minimizing constitutional harm should not be given absolute prior-
ity, so that where sub-constitutional harm exceeds a catastrophic thresh-
old, legal actors may sometimes even be justified in choosing an uncon-
stitutional course over a constitutional one; and (3) in choosing among 
unconstitutional options, it is better to acknowledge conflict than to 
recategorize constitutional violations in ways that suppress or disguise 
conflict. 
D. Preserve, to the Extent Possible, the Ability To Undo or Remedy Constitutional 
Violations 
Our final general principle states that government officials choosing 
among unconstitutional options should preserve, to the extent possible, 
their own ability and the ability of other actors to undo or remedy consti-
tutional violations. Often the choice among unconstitutional options will 
be controversial. Indeed, sometimes it will not even be clear that one or 
another proposed course of action really is unconstitutional. Accord-
                                                                                                                 
226. William Styron, Sophie’s Choice (Modern Library 1998) (1979). 
227. As Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver note, people who think that all 
normative decisions can be reduced to a single currency (such as aggregate utility) have 
difficulty “accounting for the notion that moral choice sometimes involves the need to act 
even in the face of irreconcilable conflict among values.” Alexander & Peñalver, supra 
note 203, at 99. One could analogize the moral monists that Alexander and Peñalver 
critique to those constitutional interpreters who favor suppressing conflict among 
constitutional clauses and doctrines. 
228. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional?, 112 Yale L.J. 1011, 1105 (2003) (invoking Walzer and Max Weber). 
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ingly, such controversy should weigh in favor of some proposed choice 
that is readily reversible. 
To the extent that a choice among putatively unconstitutional 
options is controversial because of a contest over constitutional meaning, 
political actors ought to strive to ensure that their favored option permits 
expeditious judicial review. This factor arguably cuts against our own pri-
oritization in the debt ceiling trilemma. Recall that by our lights, the 
president’s two worst unconstitutional options were unilaterally cutting 
spending and unilaterally raising taxes, while his least bad unconstitu-
tional option was to issue Presidential bonds. Yet cutting spending or 
raising taxes would likely lead to justiciable cases, whereas issuing 
Presidential bonds might not. 
A decision to cut spending would quickly lead to a lawsuit by a 
person or entity legally entitled to receive funding absent the cut.229 
Likewise, a decision to raise taxes would likely lead to a lawsuit by some 
party whose resulting tax liability increased. To be sure, given the Anti-
Injunction Act, a taxpayer could not seek to enjoin the assessment or 
collection of his increased taxes, but once he paid the tax, he could sue 
for a refund in the Tax Court, with review in the Article III courts, 
including the potential for certiorari review by the Supreme Court to 
follow.230 But a lawsuit challenging the president’s decision to issue 
Presidential bonds would not necessarily lead to litigation. 
Would anyone suffer the sort of concrete and particularized injury 
needed to authorize Article III standing as a consequence of the issuance 
of Presidential bonds? If the government were to fail to pay interest or 
principal to the holder of a Presidential bond, then the bondholder 
would clearly suffer injury. But what if the government does not default? 
One can imagine litigation that would indirectly raise the question 
of the validity of the Presidential bonds. Suppose that state law or the 
contractual terms governing some investment fund provide that the fund 
may only hold “legal” bonds and securities. Suppose further that the 
fund manager adds Presidential bonds to the fund’s portfolio. A state 
official or fund beneficiary might then sue the manager of the fund for 
violating state law or the contractual terms, and the outcome of the 
action would depend on the legality of the underlying Presidential 
bonds.231 But it is not obvious that such a dispute would arise quickly 
                                                                                                                 
229. Clinton v. City of New York is straightforward precedent. The City of New York 
successfully challenged spending cuts that President Clinton made under the Line Item 
Veto Act. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).  
230. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006); cf. Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 75 (1958) 
(discussing settled principle of “pay first and litigate later”). 
231. Such a lawsuit might fall within the statutorily authorized original jurisdiction of 
the federal courts, see Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199 (1921) 
(upholding statutory federal question jurisdiction where state law restricted investments to 
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enough to present the issue of the bonds’ validity for expeditious judicial 
resolution. 
Are there other mechanisms by which the Presidential bonds’ valid-
ity could come before the courts? Perhaps holders of other government 
debt (for example, Treasury bonds) might worry that by increasing the 
total debt, Presidential bonds make it less likely that they will receive 
payment—much in the way that the holder of a first mortgage on a home 
might worry that the homeowner’s further indebtedness to new lenders 
puts the initial loan at greater risk. Yet as we explained above, the princi-
ples of default risk applicable to private parties do not apply to a sover-
eign lending in its own currency.232 Moreover, the whole point of the 
Presidential bonds would be to prevent default on existing obligations, 
and so it seems highly speculative to say that the Presidential bonds 
increase default risk. In any event, even if the Presidential bonds did 
increase default risk somewhat, the increased risk of a default in the 
indefinite future might not count as the sort of “imminent” injury that 
the Court’s cases require for Article III standing.233 Thus, it appears that 
a decision to issue Presidential bonds would be substantially more diffi-
cult to challenge in court than a presidential decision to cut spending or 
raise taxes. 
Does that fact lead us to reassess our priority among the elements of 
the trilemma? In a word, no. It is true that judicial reviewability counts 
for something, but here the reason why there would be no direct judicial 
review of the Presidential bonds is a double-edged sword that is much 
sharper on its other edge. If no one has standing to challenge the 
Presidential bonds directly, that is because no one is directly injured by 
them. In the overall cost-benefit analysis, surely the fact that Presidential 
bonds cause no concrete and imminent harm counts mostly in their 
favor, not against them. 
To be clear, we do not claim that Presidential bonds are necessarily 
harmless. Relative to spending cuts and tax increases, Presidential bonds 
increase the national debt, which could have adverse long-term conse-
quences. But spending cuts and tax increases also could have adverse 
long-term consequences, and, in addition, they cause immediate direct 
injuries in a way that Presidential bonds mostly do not. How one nets out 
the various short-term and long-term costs and benefits of each possible 
course of action is a very complicated question. Our point for now is 
simply that the absence of any direct concrete and imminent harm to an 
                                                                                                                 
“legal securities only”), but even if not, the issue could reach the United States Supreme 
Court in a case filed originally in state court. 
232. See supra text accompanying notes 80–83.  
233. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–95 (2009) (repeatedly 
reciting requirement that plaintiff seeking injunctive relief against government must 
allege imminent concrete injury). 
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identifiable party probably counts in favor of Presidential bonds by an 
amount that outweighs the cost in forgone or delayed judicial review. 
In any event, judicial review is no panacea. A court could decide a 
multi-lemma case in a way that makes clear that one course of action is 
preferred. For example, a court might decide that the president has the 
unilateral power to cut spending after all. But assuming a case in which 
there truly are no (non-catastrophic) constitutional options, a reviewing 
court does not face the same decision that a political actor does. 
For concreteness, suppose that faced with the trilemma, the presi-
dent chooses to cut spending and that a canceled beneficiary challenges 
the cuts. A reviewing court cannot simply rule that the spending cut was 
unconstitutional because, by hypothesis, anything the president might 
have done would have been unconstitutional. But as we have unpacked 
the president’s trilemma, selecting a course of action requires a delicate 
blend of constitutional and policy analysis. We can well imagine that the 
best course for the president in resolving the trilemma would be to issue 
Presidential bonds but that the courts ought to uphold the president’s 
selection of any of the horns of the trilemma as a reasonable exercise of 
his discretion. We would therefore sympathize with a holding that a 
complaint charging the president (or other political actor) with choosing 
the wrong unconstitutional option ought to be nonjusticiable. In this 
view, the president does not face a naked policy choice in choosing 
among unconstitutional options; the relevant constitutional and policy 
guideposts leave him with sufficient discretion to render the matter a 
political question. 
Whether or not a particular choice among unconstitutional options 
would lead to a justiciable case or controversy, political actors ought to 
try to take actions that can be undone by other political actors. That is 
especially true where—as in the debt ceiling trilemma—the core concern 
is separation of powers.234 Because the president, no matter what he 
does, will end up stepping on the toes of Congress, he ought to ensure 
that Congress can specify which toes it wants stepped on (or conversely, 
which toes it most wants to avoid being stepped on). 
We argued in Part II that the prior choices of Congress indicate that 
it placed a higher priority on having its decisions about taxing and 
spending respected than about having the borrowing limit respected. 
That conclusion was substantially based on the detailed political tradeoffs 
that go into taxing and spending laws, by contrast with the simple selec-
tion of a number for the debt ceiling.235 The same factors lead us to 
conclude that a presidential decision to spend or tax unilaterally would 
be more disruptive of the legal status quo than a decision to issue 
                                                                                                                 
234. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (“[C]oncern of 
encroachment and aggrandizement . . . has animated our separation-of-powers 
jurisprudence . . . .”). 
235. See supra text accompanying notes 140–143. 
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Presidential bonds, and thus, as a practical matter, substantially more 
difficult for Congress to undo. Put most simply, because a presidential 
decision to cut spending or raise taxes unilaterally usurps substantially 
more legislative power than a decision to issue Presidential bonds, cut-
ting spending or raising taxes will generally be stickier.236 If judicial 
review of a presidential decision to cut spending or raise taxes is more 
likely to occur than judicial review of the decision to issue Presidential 
bonds, effective congressional review of the Presidential bonds is more 
likely than effective congressional review of unilateral spending cuts or 
tax increases. And where, as in the debt crisis case, the core concern is 
separation of powers, preserving the opportunity for effective congres-
sional review strikes us as more important than facilitating judicial 
review. 
CONCLUSION 
The debt ceiling crisis of 2011 nearly presented President Obama 
with a trilemma of unconstitutional options. Should he or a future presi-
dent ever squarely face such a trilemma, he would have no good choices 
and certainly no good constitutional choices. But choose the president 
must. He should do so in a manner that minimizes the unconstitutional 
assumption of power, minimizes sub-constitutional harm, and maximally 
preserves the ability of other actors to undo or remedy constitutional vio-
lations. In the debt ceiling context, given the balance of constitutional, 
practical, and prudential considerations, the least unconstitutional 
choice would be for the president to continue to issue debt, in the 
amounts authorized by the duly enacted budget of the United States. 
                                                                                                                 
236. See supra text accompanying notes 144–145. We acknowledge that there is a 
sense in which issuing Presidential bonds would be stickier than either unilaterally raising 
taxes or cutting spending. The bonds (if deemed valid) would create a property interest, 
which Congress would be constitutionally obligated to respect. Cf. supra text 
accompanying note 69. By contrast, taxes raised by the president could be subsequently 
cut by Congress and spending cut by the president could be restored by Congress without 
violating the Constitution. Thus, when we say that Congress can undo a president’s 
unilateral borrowing, we do not mean that Congress could default on outstanding bonds. 
We are measuring stickiness in a practical political sense rather than a strictly legal sense. 
See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 144, at 528–33 (modeling interactions between 
president and Congress as iterative game). 
